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Canada, a major ocean user, has the longest coastline in the
world, and is a littoral state on three oceans. Canada has extensive
economic interests in fisheries and offshore hydrocarbon and mineral
development which make it a major trading nation with a conse-
quent interest in shipping. Not surprisingly, Canada was a major
participant during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (LOS Convention or UNCLOS III) when the ocean re-
gime for the future was being discussed." After a decade of negotia-
tions, the Conference produced the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea,2 one of the major accomplishments of inter-
national diplomacy, consisting of 320 articles and nine annexes.
The 1982 LOS Convention attempts to establish the law and to
act as a guidepost for state action in almost all aspects of human
interaction with the seas. An overwhelming majority of states have
signed the LOS Convention. However, the Treaty will come into
force only for those states ratifying it one year following the receipt
of the sixtieth ratification. As of November 15, 1987, thirty-four
states have ratified.
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1. For discussion concerning Canada and the UNCLOS III negotiations, see
Buzan, Canada and the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.J. 149, 171-76
(1982); de Mestral & Legault, Multilateral Negotiation - Canada and the Law of the
Sea Conference, 35 INT'L J. 47-69 (1978-80); Buzan & Johnson, Canada at the Third
Law of the Sea Conference: Strategy, Tactics and Policy in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 255 (B. Johnson & M. Zacher eds. 1977) [hereinafter CANA-
DIAN FOREIGN POLICY].
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter LOS
Convention].
The LOS Convention strikes a balance between the interests of
coastal and maritime states. The major thrust of the Treaty is to
restrain the seaward extension of coastal state jurisdiction, ensuring
continued navigational freedoms for maritime states. This thrust is
most evident from the Treaty's transit passage regime which guaran-
tees unrestrained vessel passage through international straits;3 the
restraints placed upon coastal states regarding enacting and enforc-
ing laws interfering with a vessel's right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea;4 and the virtual freedom of navigation that contin-
ues to exist in the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone.5
An equally important part of the LOS Convention is the recogni-
tion of an area of the ocean remaining open to traditional high seas
freedoms.6 Furthermore, the deep ocean floor lying beyond national
jurisdiction is to be for the "Common Heritage of Mankind," with
its resources to be harvested for the benefit of all nations.7 It was this
desire to ensure that an area of the seabed be recognized as the
Common Heritage of Mankind that inspired the United Nations in
the mid-1960s to commence a reevaluation of ocean law. The miner-
als of the deep ocean floor which became identified with the interna-
tional seabed area were nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese. These
minerals were found in polymetallic nodules at a depth of 5,000 me-
ters in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans. In the early stages of
UNCLOS III these polymetallic nodules were perceived to have
great wealth-generating potential. Although this potential is recog-
nized, it will not be until well into the twenty-first century that the
mineral wealth will be harvested.8
At UNCLOS III, the Canadian negotiators were uncommonly
successful in promoting Canada's interests and in having the Cana-
dian position accepted in the wording of the LOS Convention. Can-
ada's posture was that of a coastal state, seeking the seaward expan-
sion of national jurisdiction in order to recover and control the
resources existing in its adjacent offshore areas, while enabling Can-
3. Id. arts. 37-44.
4. Id. arts. 17-27.
5. Id. art. 58. See generally Robertson, Navigation in the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 865 (1984).
6. LOS Convention, arts. 86-90, 112, 116-20.
7. Id. arts. 133-41. See Dupuy, The Notion of the Common Heritage of Man-
kind Applied to the Seabed, 8 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 347 (1983); R. OGLEY,
INTERNATIONALIZING THE SEABED 31-42 (1984); Joyner, Legal Implications of the Con-
cept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986); and Van
Dyke & Yuen, Common Heritage v. Freedom of the High Seas: Which Governs the
Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (1982). For a more general discussion on the poten-
tial importance of the acceptance of the Common Heritage of Mankind by the interna-
tional community see E. BORGESE, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANs: A REPORT TO THE
CLUB OF ROME 144 (1986).
8. An optimistic perspective on the long-term economics and abundance of
polymetallic nodules is presented by E. BORGESE, supra note 7, at 32-34.
[VOL. 25: 535, 19881 Will Canada Ratify UNCLOS III?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ada to protect its coastal marine environment.9
Four specific Canadian interests were recognized by the LOS
Convention. Article 234 deals with Canadian concerns regarding a
special environmental regime for Arctic waters.10 Article 76 recog-
nizes the right of a coastal state to exercise jurisdiction over the geo-
logic continental shelf, where the shelf extends beyond 200 nautical
miles, as is the case on Canada's east coast. 1 Article 151 provides
protection for land-based suppliers of mineral resources from compe-
tition of deep seabed mineral resources, an obvious value to Cana-
dian mineral interests. 2 Finally, Article 66, the "salmon provision"
initiated by Canada, recognizes the state of origin's special right to
conserve and manage salmon stocks while virtually banning salmon
harvesting on the high seas.' 3
The complexity of the LOS Convention resulted in every state's
hopes not being fulfilled. Although Canadian negotiators were very
successful, some negotiating goals were unattainable. The best exam-
ple is the innocent passage regime in the Treaty, which Canada had
hoped to have included in the Treaty provisions. This regime would
allow coastal states to legislate and enforce national standards of
vessel construction, design, equipment and manning. It would also
permit coastal states to declare as non-innocent, any passage which
threatened to pollute.1 4 However, the Treaty only allows coastal
states to enact and enforce international standards regarding vessel
construction, design, equipment and manning, with passage being
non-innocent only when pollution is willful and serious. Canada has
9. In 1973 Canada set out its position on the key ocean issues to be discussed at
UNCLOS III. CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE THIRD UNITED NA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1973).
10. See McRae & Goundrey, Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters: The
Extent of Article 234, 16 U.B.C.L. REV. 197 (1982).
11. See McDorman, The New Definition of 'Canada Lands' and the Determina-
tion of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, 14 J. MAR. L. & COM. 195 (1983);
Kerr & Keen, Hydrographic and Geologic Concerns on Implementing Article 76, 62
INT'L HYDROGRAPHIC REV. 139 (1982); and Crosby, The UNCLOS III Definition of the
Continental Shelf. Application to the Canadian Offshore, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
OCEAN INDUSTRY: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND RESTRAINTS 473 (D. Johnston & N.
Letalik eds. 1984) [hereinafter D. Johnston & N. Letalik].
12. Although the production limitation provision was not originated by Canada, it
became defined as a Canadian issue. See Hage, Canada and the Law of the Sea, 8
MARINE POL'Y 2, 10 (1984); Filardi, Canadian Perspectives on Seabed Mining: The
Case of the Production Limitation Formula, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 457 (1984).
13. Hage, supra note 12, at 6; Johnson, Canadian Foreign Policy and Fisheries
in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1, at 79-82, 89-90.
14. Canadian Evaluation of the Third Law of the Sea Conference: Fifth Session,
1976, in CANADA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 52 (1978).
viewed these provisions as being less than ideal but an improvement
over the pre-existing legal standard.15
Compromises, a major part of the UNCLOS III process, made the
Treaty an indivisible whole, a package deal. As a result, if states
accept only those parts of the Treaty they like, while rejecting the
rest, the entire negotiating process will be viewed by many as a fail-
ure. Hence, while a buffet approach to the lengthy LOS Convention
is an appealing one, the idea of individual states picking and choos-
ing only the positive aspects of the text is decried by the major par-
ties that negotiated the Treaty. At the closing ceremonies, UNCLOS
III President T.T.B. Koh of Singapore stated:
Although the Convention consists of a series of compromises and many
packages, I have to emphasize that they form an integral whole. This is why
the Convention does not provide for reservations. It is therefore not possible
for States to pick what they like and to disregard what they do not like. In
international law as in domestic law, rights and duties go hand in hand. It
is therefore legally impermissible to claim rights under the Convention
without being willing to assume the corollary duties.16
At the signing ceremony for the LOS Convention, Canadian Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister Allan J. MacEachen extolled the virtues of
the Treaty and stated how important the new Treaty was for
Canada.
The Convention sets out a broad range of new rights and responsibilities. If
States arbitrarily select those they will recognize or deny, we will see not
only the end of our dreams of a universal comprehensive convention on the
law of the sea but perhaps the end of any prospect for global cooperation on
issues that touch the lives of all mankind. We must not - we cannot -
allow that to happen. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and that alone, provides a firm basis for the peaceful conduct of ocean
affairs for the years to come. It must stand as one of the greatest accom-
plishments of the United Nations and worthy of the support of every
nation.17
Despite the success of Canada at the negotiating table, the fact
that Canada is one of the major beneficiaries of the new law of the
sea, the recommendation of the House of Commons Special Joint
Committee on Canada's International Relations that Canada ratify
the Treaty,18 and the confident words of some Canadian officials
about ratification,1 9 five years after completion of the LOS Conven-
15. de Mestral & Legault, supra note 1, at 67. See generally Hage, supra note
12, at 6; and McDorman, National Legislation and Convention Obligations: Canadian
Vessel-Source Pollution Law, 7 MARINE PoL'y 302, at 306-07 (1983).
16. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, OFF. REc. at 14
(1984) [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
17. Id. at 16.
18. INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONALISM: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT
COMMITTEE ON CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43 (1986).
19. It has been reported that in response to the question whether Canada might
not ratify the LOS Convention, the Legal Adviser to External Affairs, Len Legault said,
"That's a policy question I can't answer, but put it this way: I've never thought of it."
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tion Canada has offered few hints about its decision on ratification.
As a signatory to the Treaty, Canada is obliged not to take action
which would "[d]efeat the object and purpose" of the Treaty until
such time as ratification takes place or until a policy of non-ratifica-
tion is formally announced. 20 This article will outline the issues that
must be faced, and the concerns that must be balanced in answering
the question of whether Canada will ratify the 1982 LOS
Convention.
The question of Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention will
be addressed from three perspectives: as a question of oceans policy;
of economic policy; and of foreign policy. These three perspectives
are not mutually exclusive and the division suggested is recognized
as artificial; however, the perspective which is dominant at the time
the decision on the Treaty is made will determine the outcome.
Before turning to the question of Canadian ratification, it is first nec-
essary to briefly note the related events which have occurred since
the completion of the LOS Convention.
THE LOS CONVENTION: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
United States' Actions
The major event that has colored the first five years following the
completion of the LOS Convention occurred just prior to the
Treaty's conclusion. In the final negotiating sessions, the United
States reassessed the goals they were seeking to attain through the
completion of a new, comprehensive ocean treaty. The goal of previ-
ous administrations had been to protect navigational rights.21 Evalu-
ating the situation in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration
viewed navigational rights as sufficiently protected by customary in-
ternational law evolving from state action pursuant to UNCLOS
111.22 The goal of the Reagan Administration in the UNCLOS III
Reluctance Threatens Future of Sea Treaty, Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 13, 1984, at
A14, col. 1.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18 done May 23, 1969; U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Canada became a party to this
treaty in 1970. See generally Gamble & Frankowska, The Significance of Signature to
the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
121 (1984).
21. A. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 234-37, 350-
51, 380 (1981). The arguments in favor of a comprehensive Treaty for protection of U.S.
navigational interests can be found in Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other
Traditional National Security Considerations, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (1982).
22. Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1011 (1982).
negotiations was to stress security of supply of strategic minerals.2 3
This was a change from the previous policy of trading-off access to
deep seabed minerals for protection of navigational rights. The
United States became very concerned about the deep seabed regime
envisioned in the LOS Convention, especially the role that the Inter-
national Seabed Authority was to play with respect to the harvesting
of and the access to minerals on the deep ocean floor. Despite last
minute efforts at compromise and several important concessions,2'
the United States viewed the LOS Convention provisions regarding
the deep seabed regime as "fatally flawed" and decided not to sign
the Treaty. 5 Also, the United States declined to participate in the
Preparatory Commission, the body designed to establish the techni-
cal regulations regarding seabed mining that are to guide the Inter-
national Seabed Authority.26
The United States viewed the deep seabed regime to be estab-
lished by the LOS Convention as detrimental to its interests for the
following reasons: the decision-making in the regime did not fairly
reflect the political and economic interests or the financial contribu-
tion of participating states; access to the seabed resources was not
guaranteed to qualified entities; the regime was perceived as being
detrimental to the development of deep seabed resources; and the
regime would set an undesirable precedent for other international or-
ganizations.2 The United States was also unhappy with the LOS
23. Id. at 1011. On the importance of access to strategic minerals, see The Law
of the Sea Convention, excerpts from a White House Office of Policy Information Paper
(April 15, 1983), reprinted in 26 No. 2 OCEANUS 74-76 (1983); Pendley, The U.S. Will
Need Seabed Minerals, 25 No. 3 OCEANUS 12-17 (1982). One commentator has de-
scribed the changing position on the LOS Convention as being the result of a perception
that the United States and Soviet Union were about to engage in a resources war over
strategic minerals and the LOS Convention might inhibit U.S. access. Kimball, Turning
Points in the Future of Deep Seabed Mining, 17 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 367, 377
(1986).
24. For details regarding the last negotiating session in 1982, see Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of the Sea 1981-1982, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 679, 679-704 (1983);
Report of the U.S. Delegation-Eleventh Session, March 8 to April 30, 1982, reprinted in
REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CON-
FERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 532 (M. Nordquist & C. Park eds. 1982). Canada's
role in trying to bridge the gap between the Group of 77 and the United States at the
last negotiating session is described in Hage, supra note 12, at 12-13. The most impor-
tant concession formulated in the last session was the resolution on Preparatory Invest-
ment Protection (PIP) ultimately adopted as Resolution II of UNCLOS III.
25. For discussion concerning the decision to reject the LOS Convention, see Lar-
son, The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention, 14 OCEAN DaV. & INT'L L. 337
(1985).
26. On the Preparatory Commission, see Paolillo, The Preparatory Commission
for the International Sea-bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 321 (B. Vukas ed. 1985).
27. The reasons why the Treaty was rejected by the United States have been set
out in numerous places, for example see statement of Ambassador James L. Malone to
UNCLOS III, April 30, 1982, reprinted in Nordquist and Park, supra note 24, at 594-
97; Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475 (1982);
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Convention amendment process which might make amendments
binding on parties whether they concurred with the proposed amend-
ment or not.28 Also, the United States did not like the transfer of
technology provisions that were part of the deep seabed mining
regime.28
Despite the perceived problems with the Treaty noted above, the
real difficulty the United States had with the LOS Convention was
ideological. The deep seabed provisions promoted wealth redistribu-
tion principles as espoused in the New International Economic Or-
der.30 Former United States law of the sea negotiator Leigh Ratiner
explained the United States' rejection of the Treaty: "[The LOS
Convention] established a mixed economic system for the regulation
and production of deep seabed minerals and, as a matter of princi-
ple, the Reagan Administration could not, consistent with its free
enterprise philosophy, have done otherwise [than reject the Treaty]
when the time came to vote." 31
The United States non-participation immediately raised questions
about the future of the LOS Convention and whether it would be
Goldwin, Common Sense v. "Common Heritage" in LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY Di-
LEMMA, 59 (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C. Buredi eds. 1983); Malone, Who Needs the Sea
Treaty?, 54 FOREIGN PoL'Y 44 (1984) [hereinafter Malone, Sea Treaty].
28. Concerning the amendment provisions, see Oxman, The Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L.
211, 250-53 (1981). U.S. objections are articulated by Malone, Sea Treaty, supra note
27, at 54.
29. See generally Van Dyke & Teichmann, Transfer of Seabed Mining Technol-
ogy: A Stumbling Block to U.S. Ratification of the Convention of the Law of the Sea?,
in D. Johnston & N. Letalik, supra note 11, at 518-50.
30. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was the proposal made by
the developing countries to redress economic inferiority. Fundamental to the NIEO as
part of a restructing of economic power relations was a proposed redistribution of wealth
from developed to developing countries. The NIEO was comprehensively articulated in a
series of 1974 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. The literature regarding
the NIEO and the law of sea is extensive. See, e.g., Borgese, The New International
Economic Order and the Law of the Sea, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 584 (1977); Juda,
UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J.
221 (1979); Ogley, The Law of the Sea Draft Convention and the New International
Economic Order, 5 MARINE POL'Y 240 (1981); Gamble, The Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea and the New International Economic Order, 6 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & Comp. L.J. 65 (1983); and Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The
Challenge of the New International Economic Order, 7 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1
(1984).
31. Ratiner, supra note 22, at 1006. See also Burke & Brokaw, Ideology and
The Law of the Sea, in B. Oxman, D. Caron, & C. Buredi, supra note 27, at 43, 57; Law
of the Sea Convention, supra note 23; Brown, The United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 1982: The British Government's Dilemma, 37 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
259, 273-76 (1984).
worth pursuing without United States involvement. An overwhelm-
ing majority of states voted in favor of the Treaty in 1982,32 and 159
states and other entities have signed the LOS Convention.3" The only
major United States allies not to sign the Treaty are the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, although both par-
ticipate in the work of the Preparatory Commission as observers.
Few states thus far have rejected the LOS Convention outright; even
the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have
kept their options open. Malcolm Rifkind, British Minister of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated in the British House of
Commons that although the United Kingdom was not going to sign
the Treaty:
It would be open to the United Kingdom, or to other countries which have
not signed, to become a party to the convention if in the future it is im-
proved in a way that we would find appropriate .... We have not followed
the United States. We have insisted on participating in the [P]reparatory
[C]ommission and have shown ourwillingness in certain circumstances to
accept the desirability of signing the convention, while the United States
has taken a harsher position on most of the issues. 3'
The general mood is that the LOS Convention can succeed without
the United States, although it remains to be seen whether the west-
ern nations will move out of step with the United States.
United States policy regarding the LOS Convention has been to
express general support for the provisions of the Treaty not dealing
with the deep seabed mining regime, 5 although on specific issues the
United States has continued to disagree with the Treaty. One such
issue is coastal state jurisdiction over tuna, provided in Article 64 of
the LOS Convention. The United States has continued to assert that
tuna does not fall within coastal state jurisdiction.36
32. Only four states voted against the Treaty: the United States, Venezuela, Tur-
key and Israel. Seventeen states abstained: Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslova-
kia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, It-
aly, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Thailand, the
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The 130 votes in favor included Australia, Canada,
China, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland
and Sweden.
33. The only non-signatory states as of October 31, 1986 were: Albania, Ecuador,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Holy Sea, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, Peru, San Marino,
Syria, Tonga, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. Four
entities have signed the Treaty: the Cook Islands, Namibia, Niue and the European Eco-
nomic Community.
34. Statement of Malcolm Rifkind, reprinted in 55 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INT'L
L. 561-63 (1984). Concerning Britain's policy generally, see Brown, supra note 31. The
position of the Federal Republic of Germany is similar; see Jenisch, German Non-Signa-
ture of the New Law of the Sea Convention, 36 AUSSEN POLITIK 157-175 (1985).
35. Statement of President Reagan regarding United States Ocean Policy, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
36. Id. See generally Harrison, Costs to the United States in Fisheries by Not
Joining the Law of the Sea Convention in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: TnE-
UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 351 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985)
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The United States proclaimed an exclusive economic zone in
198337 and has taken pains to present its view that those parts of the
LOS Convention that protect navigational rights are part of custom-
ary international law, most particularly the right of transit passage
through international straits. 8 It remains unclear whether the
transit passage regime which permits unmolested travel of vessels
through international straits is part of customary international law,
or is a right available only to parties contracting to the LOS Conven-
tion. 39 Generally, the United States has asserted its perceived navi-
gational rights on the basis of the LOS Convention.40
The United States has attempted to undermine the envisioned
LOS Convention regime regarding the deep seabed by unilaterally
granting licenses to United States firms for deep seabed mineral ex-
ploration.41 Additionally, the United States has attempted to build
alliances with like-minded deep seabed mining states to establish a
regime that would operate outside the LOS Convention. The United
States has been unable to entice other mining states into a separate
regime, although in August 1984 eight states, including the United
States, concluded an agreement entitled the Provisional Understand-
ing Regarding Deep Seabed Mining.42 This agreement established
[hereinafter J. Van Dyke]; Wade, A Proposal to Include Tunas in U.S. Fishery Juris-
diction, 16 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 255 (1986); Burke, Highly Migratory Species in
the New Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 273 (1984).
37. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (1983).
38. See Hoyle, Discussion in J. Van Dyke, supra note 36, at 292. Hoyle states:
"The U.S. position is that the nonseabed provisions of the Convention are existing inter-
national law" (emphasis in original). The United States view that transit passage rights
are part of customary international law is well described by Harlow, Comment, 46 No, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 128 (1983).
39. The debate is well articulated by the various commentators. See Hoyle, Dis-
cussion in J. Van Dyke, supra note 36, at 292-302. See also Lee, The Law of the Sea
Convention and Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 541 (1983) (focuses on the transit
passage regime).
40. See Statement of President Reagan, supra note 35. See also Department of
State statement of March 26, 1986, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL., May 1986,
at 79.
41. Pursuant to the U.S. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No.
96-283, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (1980), licenses were granted to four mine sites in late 1984.
Larson, Deep Seabed Mining: A Definition of the Problem, 17 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.
J. 271, 289-90 (1986). The original intention of the Act was to put pressure on UN-
CLOS III to reach a conclusion and to act as an interim legal regime pending the com-
ing into force of the LOS Convention. A. HOLLICK, supra note 21, at 371-72. The legis-
lation indicates that no seabed mining is to take place before January 1, 1988.
42. Reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1354-60 (1984). In 1982, France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had reached a similar type
of agreement. Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic
Nodules of the Deep Seabed, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982). See Larson, supra note
procedures to avoid conflicts respecting deep seabed mining sites.
While some American spokesmen viewed this eight-party Agreement
as the commencement of a viable deep seabed regime outside the
LOS Convention,43 states which are parties to the agreement and
signatories to the LOS Convention quickly pointed out that the
Agreement was consistent with the Treaty.""
The "Group of 77"4' and the Eastern Bloc Countries condemned
the 1984 Agreement. In response to United States action, these
countries forced the Preparatory Commission to adopt, in August
1985, a declaration stating that any claim, agreement or action re-
specting deep seabed minerals made outside the LOS Convention re-
gime was "wholly illegal."46 In 1986, this declaration was extended
to condemn the seabed licenses granted by the United Kingdom and
Federal Republic of Germany,'7 with most of the western nations
again expressing their reservations about the confrontational nature
of the declaration. 8
The Preparatory Commission
The major focus of attention in the post-UNCLOS III era has
been upon the work of the Preparatory Commission. This Commis-
sion was established by a resolution of UNCLOS III and assigned
the task of drafting the detailed, technical rules necessary to imple-
ment the provisions of the LOS Convention on deep seabed mining."9
41, at 279-80 and at 282 where he comments that "(i)f the U.N. Convention does not
come into force and effect with sufficient ratification by January 1, 1988, the Provisional
Understanding might provide a basis for unilateral or multilateral deep seabed mining
outside the Convention."
43. See Kimball, supra note 23, at 378. Similar comments were made following
the 1982 four party agreement. See Cohen, International Cooperation on Seabed Min-
ing, in B. Oxman, D. Caron, & C. Buredi, supra note 27, at 101, 106.
44. Kimball, supra note 23, at 378 and in particular note the Japanese view that
the 1984 Provisional Understanding is not at variance with the LOS Convention.
Hayashi, Japan and Deep Seabed Mining, 17 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.J. 351, 360
(1986).
45. The Group of 77 is the name given the developing countries' bloc that has
emerged within the United Nations system. The Group of 77 was established in the
1960s in order to pursue the common interest of developing countries at the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It is currently comprised of
well over 100 countries. See Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United
Nations: Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1979).
46. Declaration Adopted by the Preparatory Commission on 30 August 1985,
U.N. Doc. LOS/PCN/72, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, at 85-86 (October
1985).
47. The United Kingdom issued a license in late 1984, the Federal Republic of
Germany in early 1986. Kimball, supra note 23, at 378.
48. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News, 3-4 (May 1986). The declaration
was approved by a vote of 59 to 7, with 10 abstentions. Canada voted against the
declaration.
49. Resolution I of UNCLOS III, Establishment of the Preparatory Commission
for the International Sea-bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law
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The Preparatory Commission has been left the unenviable task of
ensuring that these rules clarify and modify the Treaty to make the
LOS Convention deep seabed mining regime acceptable to the major
mining states. All of the deep seabed mining states have made it
clear that a satisfactory set of operating rules for deep seabed min-
ing is necessary before there can be ratification. 50 External Affairs
Minister MacEachen conveyed Canada's position at the signing cer-
emonies for the LOS Convention:
The future will depend on how well the Preparatory Commission does its
work with respect to sea-bed mining and the outer continental shelf. We
know that some Governments have difficulties with the sea-bed mining pro-
visions of the Convention. We hope that these problems can be solved
through the development by the Preparatory Commission of rules, regula-
tions and procedures. Canada looks to their satisfactory solution. If the Pre-
paratory Commission adopts a realistic and pragmatic attitude the future is
assured."1
The work of the Preparatory Commission has proceeded at a steady
pace.52 At times, this work has been overshadowed by attempts to
entice the seabed mining states to protect their interests in deep sea-
bed mining by participating in the LOS Convention regime.
The first such enticement was Resolution II of UNCLOS III, the
PIP resolution, which provided that entities which were involved in
deep seabed mining prior to the completion of the LOS Convention
(pioneer investors) would have their investment protected under the
international regime.53 The PIP resolution was a major concession
made to the industrialized countries by the developing countries at
the last negotiating session. The weight of this concession was made
clear from the statement of UNCLOS III Conference President Am-
bassador Koh:
I know that what I am asking you to do is to agree, essentially, to make a
series of unilateral concessions to the United States and other industrialized
countries. But I ask you to bear in mind that the concessions which I am
asking you to make do not hurt in any significant way, the interests of your
[g]roup or of your countries. I believe it is a price worth paying in order to
of the Sea, Annex I of the Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law
of the Sea, done Oct. 21, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1245 (1982).
50. Kimball, supra note 23, at 375.
51. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, at 15.
52. See The 1986 Report of the Secretary-General on the Law of the Sea to the
U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/41/742, Oct. 28, 1986, 28-32 and Kimball, supra
note 23, at 384-87.
53. On the PIP resolution see Bruckner, Preparatory Investment Under the Con-
vention and the PIP Resolution in A. KOERS & B. OXMAN, THE 1982 CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 181 (1984).
enhance the prospects of attracting universal support for our Convention. 4
Much of the high profile work undertaken by the Preparatory
Commission relates to registering the pioneer investors, and dealing
with overlapping claims that might be made by them. The Prepara-
tory Commission established that only states which signed the
Treaty by December 10, 1984, could seek registration as pioneer in-
vestors. Nineteen countries opted to sign the Treaty at the last min-
ute,55 including the European Economic Community which, by con-
sensus, agreed to sign despite the decisions of the United Kingdom
and the Federal Republic of Germany not to sign.58
Implementation of Resolution II will require the Preparatory
Commission to register the mine sites claimed by the pioneer inves-
tors. France, India, Japan and the Soviet Union have stepped for-
ward to indicate their desire to have their mine sites registered and
to apply for pioneer status. This action assures these countries of
preferential treatment and protection of their mine sites from subse-
quent miners. The Soviet Union, in particular, has pressed to have
its mine sites recognized by the Preparatory Commission in order to
attain a preferred status, since it appears that their claims overlap
with sites of states currently outside the LOS Convention regime.57
Several states, including Canada, argued that all overlaps between
states currently seeking pioneer status and overlaps with potential
applicants had to be resolved before registration could take place.58
On September 5, 1986, the Preparatory Commission completed
work on an understanding for resolving disputes respecting the over-
lapping claims to mining sites. The understanding takes into account
the interests of the four states seeking immediate pioneering status
and the potential applicants for mining sites recognized and named
in Resolution II.59 An important part of the understanding, which
54. Report of the President to the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.141
(1982), reprinted in M. Nordquist & C. Park, supra note 24, at 586-87.
55. Kimball, supra note 23, at 379.
56. However, the E.E.C. did attach a declaration to its signature indicating that
several of its members took the view that deficiencies and flaws existed in the deep sea-
bed regime. The E.E.C., as an entity, does not have direct competence regarding deep
seabed mining. See Hardy, The Law of the Sea and the Prospects for Deep Seabed
Mining: The Position of the European Community, 17 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.J. 309
(1981); Simmonds, The Community's Declaration upon Signature of the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 521 (1986) and comments of
British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Malcolm Rifkind, supra
note 34, at 561.
57. Kimball, supra note 23, at 376.
58. Id. at 379-80.
59. The Agreement is reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1326-30 (1986) and 8 LAW OF THE
SEA BULLETIN 48 (Nov. 1986). See The 1986 Report of the Secretary-General on the
Law of the Sea to the U.N. General Assembly, supra note 52, at 28-29; Report of the
Preparatory Commission on Fourth Session Meetings - 11 August to 5 September 1986
in 8 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 38-39 (Nov. 1986); and Council on Ocean Law, Oceans
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was unanimously adopted by the Preparatory Commission, was that
in order for potential applicants to take advantage of pioneer status
they must submit their application before the entry into force of the
LOS Convention.6 °
The September 5, 1986 understanding was perceived as a major
breakthrough for the Preparatory Commission61 and should allow for
the registration of pioneer investors who will then have priority over
mine sites under the LOS Convention regime. It is clear from other
aspects of the understanding that more flexibility is being granted
the miners at the expense of the International Seabed Authority and
Enterprise, in order to make the LOS Convention regime more se-
cure and enticing for deep seabed miners.62 One observer stated that
the understanding "clears the deck" for a concerted effort on the
part of Commission delegates to get on with their work of developing
a deep seabed mining code, since it is necessary for there to be fur-
ther demonstrations of progress to entice mining states to ratify the
Treaty. 3
RATIFICATION AS A QUESTION OF OCEANS POLICY
One of the major purposes of the UNCLOS III was to promote
uniformity and to prevent the continuing chaos of inconsistent state
action respecting the oceans.6
The most important reason why states are pressing forward with the Con-
ference is widespread dissatisfaction with the existing legal regime, or lack
of, it in the oceans. Some believe that respect for certain aspects of the
traditional law of the sea is breaking down and that interests protected by
that traditional law are being jeopardized. This has been the reaction, for
example, to unilateral extensions of the territorial sea and other forms of
coastal state jurisdiction. Some believe that the traditional law does not ad-
equately protect current or anticipated interests. This has been the reaction
by many states to the conservation and economic problems created by the
development of large and highly mobile distant-water fishing fleets. Some
believe that the absence of sufficiently precise legal rules to deal with new
or newly perceived problems and uses, such as pollution of the marine envi-
ronment and the development of technology to exploit the deep seabeds,
could prejudice their interests. 5
Pol'y News, 2-4 (Sept. 1986).
60. 25 I.L.M. 1326-30 (1986).
61. Report of the Preparatory Commission on Fourth Session Meetings - 11 Au-
gust to 5 September 1986, supra note 59, at 38.
62. See Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News at 2 (Sept. 1986).
63. Kimball, The Decisions Ahead, 11 MARINE POL'Y 69, 69-70 (1987).
64. An overview from the United States perspective of events taking place in the
1960s that led to the need for a comprehensive treaty is given in A. HOLLICK, supra note
21, at 160-70.
65. Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference,
As a matter of oceans policy the LOS Convention has been ex-
tremely important for Canada, since it has provided legitimacy to
previous Canadian actions and a stability in ocean matters that ben-
efits Canada. With or without ratification, the advantages of the
LOS Convention will probably accrue to Canada. However, it must
be determined whether Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention
will enhance these advantages and whether other advantages from
ratification exist which outweigh any negative aspects the Treaty
may have upon Canada's future oceans policy and Canada's predi-
lection to be a non-ratifying "free rider."
The Myth of Unilateralism
Canadians have a perception that, in ocean matters, Canada can
take and has taken unilateral action to protect its interests. This per-
ception arose from government action in the 1960s and 1970s when
Canada was in the forefront of states which were expanding and
consolidating national jurisdiction over the marine environment and
the living resources in its adjacent offshore areas. Canada's first uni-
lateral expansion of jurisdiction came in 1964 when Canada claimed
a nine nautical mile fishing zone in addition to the traditional three
nautical mile territorial sea. Established domestically, this expansion
was ineffective in decreasing foreign fishing within the zone and has
been described as a "disastrous flop." 6  Also in the 1960s, Canada
desired to establish straight baselines along its coasts, in order to
ensure that the waters landward of the baselines were under com-
plete Canadian jurisdiction. The United States objected to many of
the proposed lines and indicated that it would directly challenge the
lines.6 7 Canada revised its proposals and, although the baselines an-
nounced in 1970 were protested by the United States, no direct chal-
lenge was made.68
Canada's most adventurous unilateral action was the 1970 Arctic
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 2 (1974).
66. Johnson, supra note 13, at 66.
67. A. HOLLICK, supra note 21, at 172.
68. Id., at 172-73. In the Arctic, an area of particular sensitivity, Canada opted
not to proceed with its proposed straight baselines following criticism from both the
United States and the United Kingdom. See McConchie & Reid, Canadian Foreign Pol-
icy and International Straits, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1, at 166 and
Gotlieb, Canadian Diplomatic Initiatives: The Law of the Sea in FREEDOM AND
CHANGE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LESTER B. PEARSON, 145-47 (M. Fry ed. 1975). Only in
1985 were the straight baselines in the Arctic put in place. Territorial Sea Georgraphical
Coordinates (Area 7) Order, P.C. Order 1985-2739, Sept. 10, 1985, SOR/85-872.
Canada has still not utilized straight baselines to enclose the waters of Hecate Strait,
the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of St. Lawrence as internal waters. In 1971 Canada did draw
fisheries closing lines in an attempt to prevent foreign fishing in those waters. The fisher-
ies closing lines are a uniquely Canadian phenomenon. See Herman, Proof of Offshore
Territorial Claims in Canada, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 7 (1982) and Johnson, supra note 13,
at 68.
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Waters Pollution Prevention Actes which created a 100 nautical mile
pollution prevention zone around Canada's Arctic coast. Without
question, Canada was "ahead" of international law with this action.
The United States, among others, vigorously protested the legisla-
tion.70 The legislation did not come into force until 1972 because of
consultations taking place with the affected parties. This resulted in
legislation that imposed restrictions on vessels traveling in Canada's
Arctic waters which was generally acceptable to the affected par-
ties.7 1 At UNCLOS III, Canada diligently strove to ensure that the
final treaty would support Canada's Arctic legislation, resulting in
the previously mentioned Article 234.
Finally, Canada's 200 nautical mile fishing zone established in
1977,72 was initially perceived by the public as a unilateral an-
nouncement. However, by the time it was put in place all the af-
fected parties had concurred.73 Moreover, it was clear by 1977 that
the 200 nautical mile zone had wide support at UNCLOS III. Thus,
no state, even the United States which almost simultaneously an-
nounced its own 200 nautical mile fishing zone, was upset by Can-
ada's action.
In summary, it should be clear that Canada's past reliance on uni-
lateralism in ocean matters is largely mythical. To be successful,
Canada, a middle state without the power of a major state, must
proceed in step with international trends, although, of course, Can-
ada can assist in developing new trends.
Customary Law and Treaty Law
As a major user of the oceans, Canada benefits from the existence
of a stable, definable ocean law. This benefit would be enhanced by
Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention and promotion of the
69. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 2 as
amended.
70. The U.S. protest and Canadian response are reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 605 (1970).
See generally Gotlieb & Dalfen, National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility:
New Canadian Approaches to International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 229 (1973) and
M'Gonigle, Unilateralism and International Law: The Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act, 34 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 180 (1976).
71. M'Gonigle & Zacher, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Control of Marine
Pollution, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1, at 119-20.
72. Canada extended its fishing zones to 200 nautical miles by regulations under
the Territorial Seas and Fishing Zones Act: Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 1, 2 and 3)
Order, CAN. CONS. REGS. ch. 1547; Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order,
CAN. CONS. REGS. ch. 1548; and Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order, CAN. CONS.
REGS. ch. 1549.
73. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 86-87.
Treaty, because the more states that ratify the Treaty, the stronger
it will be. Also, reliance upon a treaty is more certain and stable
than reliance upon customary international law.
The LOS Convention is a major guidepost for state action regard-
ing the oceans; accordingly, much of the non-institutional aspects of
the LOS Convention may emerge as customary state practice, allevi-
ating the necessity for ratification. Already, state practice arising
from UNCLOS III, has led to certain aspects of the LOS Conven-
tion emerging as part of customary international law. In this way,
states are able to adopt parts of the Treaty irrespective of ratifica-
tion. Which parts of the Treaty have emerged as customary interna-
tional law is an open debate.74 However, the major jurisdictional re-
gime created by the LOS Convention, the 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone, is now part of customary international
law,15 and eighty-six states have promulgated laws and decrees es-
tablishing a 200 nautical mile fishery or economic zone.76 Regarding
the territorial sea, 100 states have adopted the twelve nautical mile
limit and three states have recently modified their previous limits of
more than twelve nautical miles to conform with the LOS Conven-
tion.77 While the ability to declare and adopt part of the LOS Con-
vention as customary law poses as an attractive alternative, it must
be noted that unlike treaty law, customary international law dealing
only in broad concepts, is difficult to determine and enforce.7 8 More-
over, selective acceptance of provisions relying upon customary law
would severely undermine the package deal approach adopted at
UNCLOS III and return the oceans to the chaos of conflicting
74. See, e.g., R. NEUBAUER & J. SHi, ESTABLISHING THE NON-SEABED PROVI-
SIONS OF THE UNCLOS III TREATY AS CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1984);
Oxman, Customary International Law and the Exclusive Economic Zone in J. Van
Dyke, supra note 36, at 138.
75. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 33
[hereinafter Libya v. Malta case].
76. The 1986 Report of the Secretary-General on the Law of the Sea to the U.N.
General Assembly, supra note 52 at 6. Concerning state practice regarding the exclusive
economic zone, see Juda, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Compatibility of National
Claims and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.J.
1 (1986).
77. The three states are Senegal, Madagascar and Ghana, The 1986 Report of
the Secretary-General on the Law of the Sea to the U.N. General Assembly, supra note
52, at 6.
78. "Reliance on customary international law has little to offer in comparison to a
multilateral convention. Customary international law tends to be a blunt instrument,
often difficult to determine and harder to enforce." Hage, supra note 12, at 14. The
customary international and treaty law dichotomy is discussed in Akehurst, Custom as a
Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 42 (1974-75); A. D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103 (1981); Howard, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 321 (1981); Gamble, The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 305 (1981); and D'Amato, The Law-Generating Mechanisms of the Law of
the Sea Conferences and Convention in J. Van Dyke, supra note 36, at 125.
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claims and tensions that UNCLOS III was designed to rectify.
A potentially important part of the careful balance struck in the
LOS Convention was the development of elaborate dispute settle-
ment provisions which increase reliance' on treaty law rather than
customary law.79 While Canadian interest in the work of UNCLOS
III on dispute settlement provisions was unenthusiastic80 and there
are difficulties with the provisions,81 the institutionalization of dis-
pute settlement for ocean problems may prove very beneficial to the
development of a stable international ocean regime. Canada has re-
cently altered its policy on the acceptance of the International Court
of Justice's compulsory dispute settlement by removing its reserva-
tion regarding:
[D]isputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or ex-
ercised by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploita-
tion of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or
control of pollution or contamination of the marine environment in marine
areas adjacent to the coast of Canada.82
Moreover, Canada has recently utilized third party dispute resolu-
tion to settle two recent east coast disputes with the United States83
and France.84 However, it can also be suggested that the dispute res-
79. U.N. Doc. A/C.62/122, part xv, art. 279-99 (1982). One of the major bene-
fits of adopting the LOS Convention is that in the case of disputes on certain subjects
third party settlement is mandated by the Treaty. Under customary law no such mecha-
nisms automatically apply. See Hage, supra note 12, at 14-15.
80. D. JOHNSTON, CANADA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 23
(1985) (summarizes Canada's posture regarding dispute settlement at UNCLOS III).
81. See generally de Mestral, Compulsory Dispute Settlement in the Third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Canadian Perspective in CONTEMP.
ISSUES IN INT'L L. 181 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1984).
82. Text of the reservation is reproduced in 9 I.L.M. 598 (1970). Notice of re-
moval of this part of Canada's reservation to the compulsory dispute settlement by the
International Court of Justice is reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1729-30 (1985). Canada changed
its position as part of its show of confidence in its argument that the waters of the Arctic
are within Canadian jurisdiction. The issue that precipitated Canada's policy change was
the transiting of the Northwest Passage by the U.S.C.G. vessel Polar Sea in the summer
of 1985. See McDorman, In the Wake of the Polar Sea: Canadian Jurisdiction and the
Northwest Passage, 27 LEs CAHIERS DE DROIT 623-46 (1986).
83. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Canada/United States) 1984 I.C.J. 245 [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case]. See gen-
erally McDorman, Saunders & VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine boundary: Dropping
anchor or setting a course?, 9 MARINE POL'Y 90-107 (1985). Post-boundary problems
continue to exist particularly regarding the fisheries where Canadian arrests of United
States fishermen have been frequent. Canada's border crackdown strains U.S. relations,
NAT'L FISHERMAN, 2-3 (Dec. 1986). The establishment of the maritime boundary has
not diminished the need for cooperative management in the Gulf of Maine area. See
generally Christie, Georges Bank - Common Ground or Continued Battleground, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 491 (1986).
84. Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, award of July
olution provisions of the LOS Convention may restrict a state's free-
dom of action in pursuing vital national interests.8"
It is interesting to note that the only state in the Western Euro-
pean and Others (WEO) bloc to ratify the LOS Convention is Ice-
land.86 The necessity for a stable international ocean law was an im-
portant part of their decision. Iceland's major concern has always
been the protection of its fishing -industry. Since 1949 Iceland has
pressed for coastal state rights over the resources adjacent to its
coast within a reasonable limit. Iceland unilaterally acted to protect
its ocean interests in the early 1970s with the enforcement of a 200
nautical mile fishing zone. This action led to a serious problem with
fishermen from the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany, and a subsequent case before the International Court.
87
Iceland rejected reliance on the International Court in this matter,
arguing that vital national interests were at stake. Through UN-
CLOS III Iceland sought multilateral support for its actions.88 At
the UNCLOS III signing ceremonies the Icelandic delegate com-
mented that the LOS Convention "represents [a] formidable result,"
primarily because of the acceptance of the economic zone regime
which was so important to Iceland. 89 On a previous occasion the rep-
17, 1986 from the Arbitral tribunal established by the Agreement of October 23, 1985
between Canada and France. The case involved interpretation of the Agreement between
Canada and France on their Mutual Fishing Relations, done at Ottawa, Mar. 27, 1972,
reprinted in U.N. LEG. SERIES, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO
THE LAW OF THE SEA, 570 (1974).
85. Compulsory dispute settlement of international disputes has never been at-
tractive to states. Diplomacy remains the manner in which states prefer to settle disputes.
See Giustini, Compulsory Adjudication in International Law: The Past, The Present,
and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1986). Given the important
exceptions that exist to compulsory dispute settlement under the LOS Convention, Arti-
cles 297 and 298, on very few issues will compulsory dispute settlement actually exist.
86. Iceland ratified the LOS Convention on June 21, 1985.
87. Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (U.K. v. Iceland, F.R. of Germany v. Iceland),
1973-1974 I.C.J.Y.B. 109 (1973-1974). See generally H. JoNSSON. FRIENDS IN CONFLICT:
THE ANGLO-ICELANDIC COD WARS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1982). Iceland refused
to appear before the Court. Regarding Iceland's non-appearance, see J. ELKIND, NON-
APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 53 (1984). The author
states:
Thus, the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases constitute the first situation in which a
State, Iceland, persisted in its contumacy through all phases of the cases in
question. In so doing, it set a precedent for the rash of non-appearances that
followed. One can sympathise with Iceland, as a small nation which is almost
totally dependent upon its fisheries and on the conservation and management of
its fisheries. But one is not debarred thereby from asking whether its failure to
appear and to take any procedural actions really served that nation's interests.
Nor is one permitted to ignore the probability that Iceland's behaviour resulted
in irreversible damage to the cause of international adjudication (emphasis in
original).
Id. at 57-58.
88. See H. JONSSON, supra note 87, at 184-87, 196-207.
89. UNCLOS III, OFF. REC., supra note 16, at 101.
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resentative, referring to the 200 nautical mile zone, stated: "for a
nation like Iceland, whose economy was overwhelmingly dependent
on the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic
zone, that result alone [acceptance of a 200 nautical mile economic
zone] made the long struggle eminently worthwhile." 90 Japan, as
well, perceives that stability is an important product of the LOS
Convention; given Japan's dependence on the oceans it has "virtually
no alternative" but to accept the Treaty.9' With these two states tak-
ing this view of the Treaty, Canada, with its extensive ocean inter-
ests, should view the Treaty similarly.
Entitlements Under the LOS Convention
Canada's need to proceed in its oceans policy in step with the in-
ternational community does not in itself provide a reason for ratifica-
tion of the LOS Convention. A review of the LOS Convention, in
particular the entitlements created by the Treaty, reveals that a
prima facie pressing need for Canada to ratify the LOS Convention
does not exist. Canada put in place a twelve nautical mile territorial
sea in 19702 and a 200 nautical mile fishing zone in 1977. Another
component of the Convention's 200 nautical mile exclusive economic
zone concerns marine pollution, and again Canada has already taken
measures to protect the marine environment. Part XX of the Canada
Shipping Act,93 dealing with vessel-source marine pollution, was en-
acted in 1970, partly in response to the Arrow oil tanker disaster on
Canada's east coast.94 The effect of extending Canada's fishing zones
in 1977 was to extend the vessel-source pollution provisions of the
90. Id. at 69-70.
91. Hayashi, supra note 44, at 353-54. Japan has been unwilling to follow U.S.
policy respecting the LOS Convention. One commentator noted that this was "a startling
and potentially powerful signal about Japanese postwar foreign policy development." Ra-
tiner, supra note 22, at 1012. Naohiro Kumagai, Deputy Director-General, Law of the
Sea Office, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, commented in 1981:
If the United States opposes participation in the convention and seeks a recip-
rocal states regime, Japan would face a very difficult dilemma: whether to go
along with the United States of America or to be on the other side of the world
community. This problem might be one of the most important choices in the
post-war history of Japanese foreign policy.
Kumagai, Commentary, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN
PACIFIC BASIN 37 (E. Miles & S. Allen eds. 1983). Kumagai's comments gave a clear
warning that Japan would not necessarily be following the United States policy on the
LOS Convention.
92. Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. T-7, as amended
R.S.C., 1970 (Ist Supp.), c. 45, s. 3(l).
93. R.S.C., 1970, c. S-9, as amended.
94. M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 71, at 118-22.
Canada Shipping Act to 200 nautical miles. 5 During the late 1960s
and 1970s Canada was viewed as being intensely committed to pro-
tection of the marine environment. At UNCLOS III Canada put
forward the idea that a pollution control zone regime should be part
of the emerging economic zone. This idea was ultimately not ac-
cepted. 6 Thus far, Canada has not adopted comprehensive economic
zone legislation, preferring to deal with the various aspects of the
zone through sectorial legislation.
Canada has also exercised rights over the full extent of the legal
continental shelf. Oil and gas permits for offshore areas were issued
by the Federal Government in the 1960s and early 1970s covering
1.2 million square miles. Although most of the permits were for ar-
eas within 200 nautical miles, some permits were issued for shelf
areas 400 nautical miles from the coast and lying as deep as 3,500
meters off the coast of Newfoundland.
97
While the legal entitlements created by the LOS Convention have
already been adopted by Canada, ratification of the LOS Convention
would validate Canada's actions, putting them on a legally stronger
base, being grounded on a firm treaty rather than on ever-shifting
customary law. This may be of particular importance regarding
Canada's claims in the Arctic.
Article 234 of the LOS Convention, which permits a state to enact
and enforce environmental legislation respecting ice-infested waters
is more rigorous than the international standard, and is an important
part of Canada's strategy to assert and exercise jurisdiction over the
waters of the Canadian Arctic. However, it is difficult for Canada to
utilize this provision to justify the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act since it is unique and part of a treaty not ratified by
Canada. The Act was also severely criticized by many states, partic-
ularly the United States, as being overly expansionistic and not in
conformity with international law.9 8 However, the leading Canadian
95. Section 727(2) of the Canada Shipping Act extends the pollution prevention
provisions of the legislation to encompass Canadian waters and fishing zones.
96. See generally M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra note 71, at 100-57 and Gold, Pol-
lution of the Sea and International Law: A Canadian Perspective, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM.
13-44 (1971). Concerning Canada's decreased interest in marine environmental issues,
see the comments of Buzan, "supra note 1, at 156 and R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACIIER,
POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 247, 280-81 (1979). Ratification
of the LOS Convention may require Canada to alter its marine environmental legislation
to ensure conformity with the Treaty. See McDorman, supra note 15.
97. Buzan & Middlemiss, Canadian Foreign Policy and the Exploration of the
Seabed in Johnson & Zacher, supra note 1, at 4-16, 17-18. Permits issued in 1964 in the
Gulf of Maine area became an important part of Canada's arguilnent in favor of the
applicability of an equidistance line. A Chamber of the International Court of Justice
ultimately rejected this approach. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 131-51, 279-81,
305-11. In 1970 Canada ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N. T. S. 311.
98. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 66.
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Arctic specialist views Article 234 as an emerging part of customary
international law.99 Also, the only state that has seriously objected to
recent Canadian Arctic claims is the United States.100 Nevertheless,
ratification of the LOS Convention would be of assistance to Canada
in its claim that the waters of the Arctic archipelago are internal
waters.
Limits on Jurisdiction
Many hope the LOS Convention will prevent further seaward ex-
tensions of national jurisdiction by acting as a brake on coastal state
expansion.101 During UNCLOS III Canada was concerned with the
limitation being placed on its seaward national jurisdiction respect-
ing both the water column and the continental shelf. While the LOS
Convention consolidates and supports many of Canada's claims to
offshore jurisdiction, Canada did not acquire everything it desired.
Ratification, arguably, may not be consistent with a flexible oceans
policy necessary for responding to future developments, since it may
hamper future offshore claims. In the past, Canada has shown a reti-
cence to ratify multilateral treaties which might impose a constraint
on its ability to expand its jurisdiction. For instance, Canada did not
ratify three of the four Geneva Conventions completed in 1958,102
since the treaties "could be construed to mean that the unilateral
declaration by a state of extending fishing jurisdiction would be
illegal. 10 3
Fishing Resources and the 200 Nautical Mile Limit
During UNCLOS III, Canada argued for an extended national
fishing zone, contending that the resources adjacent to its coasts
were in serious decline and, since Canada is the state with the pre-
dominant interest in the living resources adjacent to its shores, Can-
ada should be delegated the custodial function of protecting the liv-
99. D. PHARAND, THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE: ARCTIC STRAITS 108-09 (1984).
100. The United States will most likely not ratify the LOS Convention. See infra
text accompanying notes 183-84.
101. This was the original goal of the United States which, since the Truman
Proclamations, has been "trying to roll back and limit expansive moves of other states."
HOLLICK, supra note 21, at 19.
102. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No 5639, 516 U.N. T. S. 205; Convention on the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N. T. S. 11; Convention
on Fishing and Conservation on the Living Resources, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
103. Johnson, supra note 13, at 64.
ing resources. 04 The result of this approach was the 200-nautical-
mile fishing zone which was being adopted globally by the end of the
1970s. The custodial aspect of coastal state fisheries jurisdiction,
however, was largely ignored in the relevant provisions of the LOS
Convention. The fisheries regime that has now emerged gives almost
exclusive control over the resources in the 200 nautical mile zone to
the coastal state.0 5
The international community arbitrarily selected the 200-nautical-
mile distance as the extent of the zone.106
The potential functional effectiveness of a coastal state regime within EZ
limits is obviously impaired by the setting of uniform spatial limits which
have no particular relevance to the various managerial activities to be car-
ried out by a coastal state within the zone. The arbitrariness of 200-mile
EZ limits, as they are likely to be defined, is especially evident in fishery
management and pollution prevention.
10 7
This is particularly true for Canada's east coast where the 200 nauti-
cal-mile limit is too narrow to be useful for ocean management, since
approximately one-quarter of the famous Grand Banks of New-
foundland fishing grounds are located beyond the 200 nautical mile
limit. Hence, foreign vessels can fish with impunity outside Canada's
fishing zone with their actions having a serious impact on the re-
sources located inside the zone. Canada has attempted to combat
this problem through the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO), a multilateral organization for the distribution of quotas in
waters adjacent to Canada's 200 nautical mile zone. 08 Moreover,
Canada has sought to guarantee responsible behavior by foreign fish-
ing fleets outside the zone with quota allocations within the Cana-
dian zone.' 0 9
104. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 72-73.
105. Although these provisions place some limitations on coastal state control over
the fisheries within 200 nautical miles, how these limitations are to be interpreted is a
difficult question. See Oda, Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739 (1983).
106. See Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494
(1977).
107. Johnston, Equity and Efficiency in Marine Law and Policy in MARINE POL-
ICY AND THE COASTAL COMMUNITY 297, 308 (D. Johnston ed. 1976).
108. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, done at Ottawa, October 24, 1978, came into force January 1, 1979. Reprinted
in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA, 2 (K. Simmonds ed. 1986). See Swan,
Management of Living Marine Resources of the Sea in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL
CHOICES FOR CANADA 1985-2000 328 (1986) and see generally Johnston, Legal and
Diplomatic Developments in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 37
(1977). There is a general consensus that NAFO has not been very successful in manag-
ing the living resources beyond 200 nautical miles.
109. Concerning this policy in the 1970s, see Johnson, supra note 108, at 58-59.
Fishing vessels from Spain have caused the most difficulty for Canada on the East Coast.
Attempts have been made to prevent the Spanish from damaging the stocks outside the
200 nautical mile zone by offering quotas within the zone. See D. VANDERZWAGG, THE
FISH FEUD, at 84, n.51 (1983). In 1986 several Spanish vessels were arrested for fishing
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At UNCLOS III Canada attempted to have the Treaty acknowl-
edge a special right to manage and control overlapping resources for
those states where exploitable living resources extended beyond the
arbitrary 200 nautical mile limit.110 A vague provision, Article
63(2), was included in the LOS Convention to meet the Canadian
demand, but the provision is of limited value.111
Those arguing against Canadian ratification believe it would fore-
close the possibility, at least for the immediate future, of unilaterally
extending Canadian fisheries jurisdiction to the full extent of the ad-
jacent manageable living resources. To ratify and then take such ac-
tion would be to materially breach the Treaty. Arguably, it would be
better not to ratify the Treaty and later, when the timing was appro-
priate, extend "functional" jurisdiction over the living resources. Al-
ready, an unanimous resolution of the Newfoundland House of As-
sembly in May 1985, called on Canada to extend fisheries
jurisdiction over the entire Grand Banks.112
The Continental Margin Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
Canada took the view at the commencement of UNCLOS III that
it was entitled to jurisdiction over the full extent of the continental
margin which included the continental shelf, the slope, and the
rise. 13 On the Canadian west coast the continental margin does not
extend beyond 200 nautical miles. It appears that this is also the
case in the Arctic.1 1 4 On the east coast, however, the continental
without permits within Canada's zone, but only after a chase into the mid-Atlantic.
Trawlers flee after officers board them, Toronto Globe and Mail, May 24, 1986, at Al.
110. Hage, supra note 12, at 6-7 and Buzan, supra note 1, at 159.
111. Oda, supra note 105, at 750-51.
112. Newfoundland after extension of zone, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, May 14,
1985, at 1.
113. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 14. Canada based its
claim on the vague wording defining the outer limit of the continental shelf found in
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 97; the natural
prolongation concept described in the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of
Germany/Den.; Federal Republic of Germany/Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. I (Judgment of Feb.
20, 1969).
114. In 1983 Canadian scientists examined the Alpha Ridge which sits north of
Ellesmere Island to see if its composition was continental or oceanic. If the ridge was
continental in origin Canada may have been able to claim jurisdiction over the seabed
beyond 200 nautical miles. The results, however, indicated that the Alpha Ridge was
oceanic and hence, on the basis of Article 76, Canada cannot extend its shelf jurisdiction
beyond 200 nautical miles. Concerning the Alpha Ridge scientific expedition, see
Ohlendorf, Staking an Arctic Claim, MACLEAN'S, 48 (Apr. 4, 1983). Regarding the re-
sults, Jackson, Forsyth & Johnson, Oceanic Affinities of the Alpha Ridge, Arctic Ocean,
73 MARINE GEOLOGY 237 (1986).
margin extends well beyond 200 nautical miles.115
At UNCLOS III there was significant pressure placed on states
with extensive continental margins to accept their seabed jurisdiction
as terminating at the 200 nautical mile limit. The broad margin
states rejected this and ultimately a very complicated formula was
agreed upon (Article 76) by which the broad margin states can exer-
cise jurisdiction over the continental margin to almost the full extent
of the geologic shelf.116 Only a small portion of the continental mar-
gin is lost to the coastal state, with the formula being drafted so that
it is extremely unlikely that any hydrocarbon resources would be lost
to the adjacent coastal state.1
17
For the non-broad margin states, the key aspect of the ultimate
compromise was that broad margin states would have to determine
their seaward continental margin boundary which would be duly
publicized and scrutinized by the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf established by Annex Two of the LOS Conven-
tion. 1 Following this procedure, the outer limit would be firmly
fixed. Although Canada largely accepted the formula on the deter-
mination of the continental margin outer limit and adopted the
wording of Article 76(1) in its legislation,119 Canada has expressed
its reservations regarding the role of the Commission, noting that it
was Canada's view that the Commission was to be advisory only, and
not a body that could make its own determination of the outer
limit.12 o
A state has ten years following ratification or the coming into
force of the LOS Convention to comply with Article 76. Those argu-
ing against ratification would take the view that Canada should not
be constrained by the Treaty in establishing boundaries, particularly
where the role of the Commission is unclear. Moreover, the formula-
115. See generally McDorman; supra note 11; and Crosby, supra note 11.
116. Id. and Kerr & Keen, supra note 11. Iceland has proceeded to make a de-
tailed claim respecting shelf areas beyond 200 nautical miles explicitly based upon Arti-
cle 76. Regulation No. 196, May 9, 1985, concerning the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf to the West, South and East, reprinted in 8 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN, 10-13
(Nov. 1986). The Icelandic claim is discussed in detail in Symmons, The Rockall Dis-
pute Deepens: An Analysis of Recent Danish and Icelandic Actions, 35 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 344 at 360-67 (1986). Ecuador and Chile have also made extensive shelf claims that
appear to rely upon Article 76. See Ramakrishna, Bowen & Archer, Outer Limits of
Continental Shelf. A Legal Analysis of Chilean and Ecuadorian Island Claims and U.S.
Response, 11 MARINE POLICY 58 (1987).
117. See Eustis, Method and Basis of Seaward Delimitation of Continental Shelf
Jurisdiction, 17 VA. J. INT'L. L. 107 (1976), 125 and Emery, Geological Limits of the
Continental Shelf, 10 OCEAN DEv. AND INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1981).
118. Concerning the Commission see McDorman, supra note 11, at 206-09 and I
E. BROWN, SEA-BED ENERGY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 4.12-4.16 (1984).
119. Section 2 of the Canada Oil and Gas Act, Can. Stat., 1980-81-82-83, c. 81, §
2(b) (1981) was repealed in 1986 and replaced by section 2 of the Canadian Petroleum
Resources Act, Can. Stat. c. 45 (1986).
120. McDorman, supra note 11, at 206-07.
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tion in Article 76 is complex and much of the information required
is not available; 121 therefore, it could be argued that it is better to
avoid the obligation than to establish the outer limit and be surprised
by new technology or information, since a fixed boundary may be
impossible to move. A further aspect of the continental margin be-
yond 200 nautical miles is the revenue sharing provision (Article
82). This provision obligates states with extended continental mar-
gins to return a small percentage of resources found beyond 200
nautical miles to the International Seabed Authority.
122
Seabed Mineral Resources Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
Once the International Seabed Authority is in place it will un-
doubtedly become a powerful advocate against states seeking to ex-
pand jurisdiction over seabed resources beyond that which is permit-
ted by the LOS Convention. Most discussions on deep seabed mining
have involved polymetallic nodules, but discoveries may bring to
light new and potentially more accessible mineral resources on the
deep ocean floor. Examples of this are polymetallic sulfides, found
around hot water vents on the deep ocean floor containing sulphur,
copper, iron and zinc, and cobalt-rich manganese crusts which have
been located on seamounts in the Pacific Ocean containing cobalt,
manganese, nickel and platinum.
On the Canadian west coast there have been polymetallic sulfide
finds that are beyond but adjacent to the 200-nautical-mile limit. No
manganese crusts have been located in or adjacent to Canada's 200
nautical-mile zones. 123 The Juan de Fuca Ridge is the area of most
interest for polymetallic sulfides. This ridge follows a zig-zag pattern
along the coast of western North America. Four areas of sulfides
have been identified; two of them falling within 200 nautical miles
off Canada's shore and two falling outside the 200 nautical mile
limit.124 The LOS Convention appears to include polymetallic sul-
fides within the minerals to be managed by the International Seabed
Authority where they are located beyond national jursidiction.
12 5
121. Kerr & Keen, supra note 11, at 145-46, indicate some of the problems with
applying Article 76 particularly on the east coast of Canada.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
123. Johnson, Clark & Otto, Pacific Ocean Minerals: The Next Twenty Years in
THE PACIFIC RIM: INVESTMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE 200 (P. Nemetz ed. 1987).
124. See J. SAMSON, COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON POLYMETALLIC SULFIDE
DEPOSIrs AND OCCURRENCES OFF THE WEST COAST OF CANADA (1985).
125. Meese, The Legal Regime Governing Seafloor Polymetallic Sulfide Deposits,
17 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L. 131, 141-43, 146-49 (1986).
However, some have suggested that the negotiators at UNCLOS III
never contemplated polymetallic sulfides as being part of the deep
seabed mining regime and, therefore, a jurisdictional vacuum exists
into which national jurisdiction may flow. At UNCLOS III the
United States unsuccessfully attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween polymetallic sulfides and polymetallic nodules. The United
States wanted only the latter to come under the jurisdiction of the
International Seabed Authority.
126
Without question the primary focus of the UNCLOS III negotia-
tors in devising the deep seabed mineral regime was on polymetallic
nodules and not on sulfides or manganese crusts. It appears, there-
fore, that some of the provisions of the Treaty are unworkable with
respect to sulfides and manganese crusts.127
In 1982, the United States gave notice of its claim respecting the
polymetallic sulfides on the Juan de Fuca and Gorda Ridges adja-
cent to the United States west coast. The notice imposes no limit on
United States jurisdiction respecting polymetallic sulfides. 28 Ratifi-
cation of the LOS Convention with the consequent support for the
Common Heritage of Mankind principle for resources of the deep
ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction would make it very difficult
to justify any extension of national jurisdiction to include polymetal-
lic sulfides that do not exist within 200 nautical miles.
Bilateral Jurisdiction Issues - Boundaries
Canada has a large number of unresolved bilateral ocean bounda-
ries. With the United States, maritime boundaries do not exist in the
Beaufort Sea, 29 between British Columbia and Alaska,130 seaward
of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, 31 and seaward of the recently delim-
126. Id. at 156 and Kimball, supra note 23, at 377 regarding the concern the
Reagan Administration had with the LOS Convention precluding unilateral claims to
recent and yet undiscovered deep seabed mineral resources.
127. Charney, The Law of the Deep Seabed Post UNCLOS III, 63 OR. L. REV.
19, 41 (1984). As one author put it, the LOS Convention does not adequately deal with
the issues raised by polymetallic sulfides "and significant revisions will be necessary" to
the Treaty regime. Bleicher, The Law Governing Exploitation of Polymetallic Sulfide
Deposits from the Seabed in CONTEMP. ISSUES IN INT'L L., supra note 81, at 227.
128. Bleicher, supra note 127, at 221.
129. Note, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United
States - Canada Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 221 (1981). Canada
recently protested U.S. plans to issue drilling rights in waters in dispute. United States
plan for Beaufort fuels territorial dispute, Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 10, 1986, at
A3, col. 1.
130. Bourne & McRae, Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska
Boundary Re-Examined, 14 CANADIAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 175 (1976). The United States
has sought negotiations with Canada on this boundary but Canada reportedly has de-
clined. Howard, Canada won't negotiate B.C.-Alaska border, Toronto Globe and Mail,
Aug. 29, 1986, at A1-A2.
131. This unresolved boundary issue has not occasioned significant debate. See
Wang, Canada - United States Fisheries and Maritime Boundary Negotiations: Diplo-
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ited Gulf of Maine boundary. 13 2 The French islands of St. Pierre and
Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland create both fisheries and
boundary problems between Canada and France. 133 Finally, the
agreement between Canada and Denmark delimiting the continental
shelf between Greenland and the Canadian Arctic is incomplete as it
does not extend into the Arctic Ocean. Additionally, controversy ex-
ists over a disputed island that causes a small gap in the boundary
line.134 Canada has always been very careful in reviewing interna-
tional obligations to determine their impact upon bilateral boundary
issues because of the domestic political sensitivity of boundary
problems.
The LOS Convention provides no real guidance to states in solving
maritime boundary disputes arising from overlapping economic
zones or continental shelves, except regarding the delimitation of
overlapping territorial seas. 13 5 Articles 74 and 83, which deal with
the economic zone and continental shelf, respectively, are almost
identical. These articles, which require parties to solve their disputes
by agreement in order to reach an equitable solution, were an un-
happy compromise reached only at the last sessions of UNCLOS
111.136 Pending agreement, states are to enter into provisional ar-
rangements. 37 The International Court of Justice in the 1985 Libya-
macy in Deep Water, 38 No. 6 Behind the Headlines, 7, 21, 24-25 (1981). However, the
discovery of polymetallic sulfides in this region has created some interest. See Charney,
supra note 127, at 42, n.145.
132. Canada and the United States had the International Court deal only with
overlapping 200 nautical mile zones. There remains an area of continental shelf beyond
this which is still disputed. See Gulf of Maine Case, 184 I.C.J., at 266, para. 21.
133. In January 1987 Canada and France agreed "to initiate negotiations with a
view to concluding . . . a Compromise (Special Agreement) which shall submit to com-
pulsory third party settlement" the boundary dispute. The Compromise was to have been
finalized by December 31, 1987.
Concerning the boundary issue generally, see Symmons, The Canadian 200-Mile Fish-
ery Limit and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones Around St. Pierre and Miquelon, 12
OTTAWA L. REV. 145 (1980).
134. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Kingdom of Denmark Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Greenland and Canada. Done at Ottawa, December 17, 1973. Entered into force March
13, 1974. Canada Treaty Series 9 (1974). See Rolston & McDorman, Maritime Bound-
ary Delimitation in the Arctic Region in OCEAN BOUNDARY MAKING: ISSUES AND DE-
VELOPMENTS 30-31 (D. Johnston & P. Saunders eds. 1988).
135. Article 15 of the Treaty provides that an equidistance line is to be utilized
unless historic title or special circumstances require a different method.
136. Concerning the negotiating history of the provisions, see S. JAGOTA, MARI-
TIME BOUNDARY 219-72 (1985) and Brown, supra note 118, at 1.10.2-22.
137. See generally Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation
Agreements, 78 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 345-68 (1984).
Malta Continental Shelf Case stated: "The Convention sets a goal to
be achieved, but is silent as to the method to be followed to achieve
it. It restricts itself to setting a standard, and it is left to States
themselves, or to courts, to endow this standard with specific con-
tent." '138 Thus, regarding bilateral maritime boundary issues, the
LOS Convention is neither a hindrance nor a help to Canada.
Navigational Interests
Although Canada is primarily a coastal state, it is a user of ocean
transport and a member of the Western military bloc. Therefore,
Canada has an interest in maritime and naval issues and in ensuring
that vessels are not subject to arbitrary measures."'
The LOS Convention struck a balance between the competing in-
terests of coastal and maritime states on navigation issues, providing
stability that benefits Canada. At UNCLOS III, Canada's position
on the key navigational issue of international straits was to allow the
maritime states to have their way regarding transit passage, provided
that the Northwest Passage was not considered as an international
strait.140 As noted previously, regarding the transit passage regime in
international straits, it is uncertain whether a non-party to the LOS
Convention is entitled to its benefit.' 4' Moreover, given the historic
thrust of coastal state control over offshore areas, the LOS Conven-
tion must be seen as an important document for states desiring to
maintain navigational freedoms. Parties to the Treaty will be in a
better position to utilize its wording than non-parties. Canada's in-
terests in unimpeded navigation would be better protected through
reliance on the LOS Convention rather than on customary law. Also,
a failure of the Treaty to gather wide support would make it less
effective as a restraint upon coastal state action which threatens
navigational freedoms.
It can also be argued, however, that since the United States is
138. Libya v. Malta Case, 1985 I.C.J. at 30-31.
139. Hage, supra note 12, at 5 and see McConchie and Reid, supra note 68, at
163. Although a major trading nation, Canada does not have a substantial ship-owning
interest. See D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 36-39 and, more generally, Transport Can-
ada, Task Force Deep-Sea Shipping 76 (April 1985). Military concerns played a mini-
mal part in Canada's posture on navigational issues at UNCLOS III. Regarding the
extended zone and enforcement of Canadian laws in the zone, however, the Canadian
military has had a significant role. See Middlemiss, Canadian Maritime Enforcement
Policies in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 1, at 311.
140. Buzan, supra note 1, at 166-67. Generally on Canada and straits, see McCon-
chie & Reid, supra note 68, at 158-201. Concerning the Northwest Passage as an inter-
national strait, see D. PHARAND, supra note 99, at 88-121 wherein the author concludes
that the Northwest Passage is not at this time an international strait, although he leaves
open the possibility that, should traffic substantially increase, the waterway could become
an international strait.
141. See generally Lee, supra note 39.
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going to remain a non-party to the Treaty it will protect navigational
interests to the benefit of all states. The United States assertions
may be of little benefit to middle-power allies who lack the power of
the United States in confrontations with zealous coastal states intent
on protecting their own interests.
Conclusion
Participation in the LOS Convention deep seabed mining regime
has not been viewed as an oceans policy issue, but as an economic
policy issue with important foreign policy implications. Similarly, the
intense commitment Canada had to UNCLOS III, the leadership
role it played, and the consequent expectations created, are not di-
rectly part of an oceans policy perspective on the LOS Convention.
From an oceans policy perspective it would appear that Canada
has much to gain from ratification of the LOS Convention. Being a
party to the LOS Convention would legitimize and consolidate previ-
ous policies and could provide a valuable platform from which to
launch a much-needed integrated domestic oceans policy. The LOS
Convention, despite some unfavorable provisions, generally provides
an acceptable balance of national interests for Canada with its com-
mitment to coastal state rights and its need for protection of naviga-
tional rights. Moreover, ratification would enhance the stability of
the international ocean regime and allow Canada to rely on the cer-
tainty of a treaty, rather than the vagueness of customary law.
An important consideration for not ratifying the Treaty is that
ratification would inhibit expanding jurisdiction in the near future.
While this may be true, it is important to realize that jurisdictional
expansion beyond the limits established in the LOS Convention will
be unacceptable for at least several decades and perhaps longer,"4 2
and Canada is unlikely to move unilaterally. Therefore, the Treaty
does not really act as a constraint.
On balance, viewed from an oceans policy perspective, Canada
should ratify the LOS Convention.
142. One author is of the view that expanded seaward jurisdiction has reached a
"temporary plateau" and that while states may intensify jurisdiction within 200 nautical
miles it will be a while before it is acceptable to expand jurisdiction beyond these limits
found in the LOS Convention. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory
and Prospect, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1982).
RATIFICATION AS A QUESTION OF ECONOMIC POLICY
At UNCLOS III the emerging ocean regime was talked about in
economic development terms. The extension of national jurisdiction
to 200 nautical miles (and beyond in the case of the continental
shelf) was perceived as promising great economic benefits for all
states. Many developing states are still coming to grips with their
new zones and are deciding how to effectively utilize and maximize
the benefits of extended national jurisdiction. Developed states
moved quickly to take advantage of expanded jurisdiction. In Can-
ada's case, with the extension of fishing zones to 200 nautical miles
in 1977, fishermen immediately reaped the benefits of access to new
resources. However, the promised bonanza led to an over-stimulation
of the industry and an over-capacity which has resulted in a Cana-
dian fishing sector, particularly on the east coast, which is in poor
economic shape.143
Regarding expanded national jurisdiction, all the entitlements in
the LOS Convention have already been exercised by Canada. Ratifi-
cation of the Treaty will provide no direct increased economic benefit
except potential benefits from the deep seabed mining regime. How-
ever, part of economic policy is security and stability; ratification of
the LOS Convention will enhance the security of navigational inter-
ests and the stability of ocean law, both of which are important for
Canada's trade. The most direct economic policy issues for Canada
arising from the LOS Convention are the deep seabed mining regime
and the economic costs of ratification.
The Deep Seabed Mining Regime
When considering ratification, states with the capability to under-
take mining activities on the deep ocean floor have been preoccupied
with the workability of the deep seabed mining provisions of the
LOS Convention. However, unlike most of the other industrialized
deep seabed mining states, Canada's position on deep seabed mining
has not been motivated by fears of strategic mineral shortages or
ideology. Canada is a major world supplier of most of the minerals
that may be harvested from the polymetallic nodules on the ocean
floor. The current world surplus of the minerals which are found in
these nodules is expected to last for decades. 4 Canada remained
outside much of the UNCLOS III debate on the structure and regu-
latory machinery for deep seabed mining, 45 although Canada did
143. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 24-30 provides a brief but comprehensive
review of the problems of Canada's fishing industry and the most recent Royal Commis-
sions designed to provide answers to the problems.
144. Id. at 34-35 and Johnson, Clark & Otto, supra note 123, at 215-18.
145. Hage, supra note 12, at 10. See also Riddell-Dixon, Deep Seabed Mining: A
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engage in the debate on production controls on seabed minerals. 48
In fact, through the involvement of INCO and Noranda in United
States seabed mining consortia, Canada is in a position to participate
as a pioneer investor under Resolution II.141 Although the interest of
the two Canadian companies in deep seabed mining is difficult to
evaluate, given the condition of the mineral market it would seem
that their interest is minimal. This would explain why Canada de-
clined to participate both in the group of seabed miners which com-
menced meeting in 1980 to develop common positions, and in the
negotiations between the states with companies in the deep seabed
mining consortia that led to the 1984 Provisional Understanding Re-
garding Deep Sea Mining. 48
At the Preparatory Commission, Canada has kept a relatively low
profile compared to its role at UNCLOS III. Canada has attempted
to be a moderating influence and acts as a bridge between the Group
of 77 and those deep seabed mining states that are unhappy with the
LOS Convention. Canada helped to prevent the Soviet Union from
forcing a confrontation on overlapping claims 149 and opposed the
declarations, approved by the Preparatory Commission, condemning
the American, British and German licensing of deep seabed
miners. 110
It has been the Canadian position that the LOS Convention will
not be acceptable unless the deep seabed mining regime will be ac-
ceptable.' 51 While Canada has never articulated what would be an
acceptable regime, two concerns are potentially important in a ratifi-
cation decision. First, the Preparatory Commission would have to es-
tablish a regime which guarantees fair returns for private investors.
The Preparatory Commission has recognized the need to make deep
seabed mining attractive to private enterprise and is proceeding to
draft rules and regulations with the hope of encouraging private en-
terprise involvement. This is evident from the discussions at the Pre-
paratory Commission regarding the economic viability of the pro-
posed mining code in the current depressed market, the possibility of
hotbed for governmental politics?, 41 INT'L J. 72-94 (1985-86).
146. Hage, supra note 12, at 10-11 and generally Filardi, supra note 12.
147. Canada was not involved in the initial drafting of Resolution II, however,
despite being sympathetic to the Group of 77, it did see that its companies would be
protected. Hage, supra note 12, at 12.
148. Id. at 10 and Kimball, supra note 23, at 374.
149. Kimball, supra note 23, at 379-80.
150. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News 4 (May 1986).
151. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, at 15.
joint ventures to commence deep seabed mining, and, in particular,
provisions in the September 1986 Understanding which give more
discretion to private miners than was initially envisioned under the
LOS Convention. 52 Second, there would have to be market protec-
tion for Canadian land-based minerals. Regardless of Canada's dis-
satisfaction with the seabed mineral production limitation provision
in the LOS Convention,153 it is highly unlikely that a regime outside
the LOS Convention framework would provide any protection for
Canada's land-based minerals.
The final outline of the deep ocean mining regime has yet to
emerge from the Preparatory Commission. It can be argued that rat-
ification of the LOS Convention before all the elements of the deep
seabed regime are known is foolhardy, since Canada would have
given up its opportunity to evaluate the final details and would have
given away its most important negotiating lever. The most recent
Canadian government statement about ratification of the LOS Con-
vention noted that "[w]hen the Preparatory Commission completes
its complex task, Canada will be in a position to determine whether
to ratify the Convention."15 Waiting for the details of the regime to
be finalized may postpone a ratification decision for years, since the
actual operation of the regime may have to await significant change
in the minerals market. It has already been suggested that some of
the work assigned to the Preparatory Commission be postponed until
closer to the time when deep seabed minerals are going to be ex-
ploited.1 55 Moreover, if Canada is going to protect the pioneer inves-
tor status of INCO and Noranda, the September 5, 1986 Under-
standing reached at the Preparatory Commission makes it clear that
Canada will have to ratify the Treaty prior to its coming into force.
This decision point will be reached before deep seabed mining is eco-
nomically feasible and may be reached before all the details and
rules concerning the deep seabed regime are complete.
Although the deep seabed mining regime is of debatable impor-
tance to Canadian industrial interests, Canada has not appeared to
put a lot of weight upon such interests. One commentator has taken
the view that because deep seabed mining is so far in the future and
152. See Council on Ocean Law, OCEANS POL'Y NEWS 2, 3-4, 6-10 (Sept. 1986)
and Kimball, supra note 23, at 385-86. Kimball is of the view that it makes more sense
for the Preparatory Commission to attempt to make changes to obtain mining state sup-
port since once the LOS Convention enters into force it will be much more difficult to
make changes.
153. Hage, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that Canada attempted to have changes
made to the formula during the 1980 and 1981 sessions but in 1982 defended the
formula from attack by the United States).
154. CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 42 (1986).
155. Council on Ocean Law, OCEANS POL'Y NEWS 3 (Sept. 1986).
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the workability of any international regime unclear, "Canadian in-
volvement in the new UNCLOS III regime for deep ocean mining
should be based on foreign policy, not on industrial concerns. "156
Economic Costs
Ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention will require Canada to take
action to ensure that the legal obligations of the Treaty are imple-
mented. For Canada, the economic costs of national implementation
would not be great. Many of the major requirements of the LOS
Convention regarding legislation, the gathering, utilizing and dissem-
inating of scientific information, and the monitoring of the environ-
ment, are either already being undertaken or can easily be met
through new practices. However, there is a cost to internally imple-
ment the legal obligations of the Treaty. This cost is uncertain, espe-
cially in Canada's case because, as one of the major beneficiaries
under the Treaty and as a world leader on many ocean issues, imple-
mentation should involve Canada in undertaking a "maximalist" ap-
proach to the Treaty obligations rather than a narrow, technical,
"minimalist" approach. Canada should adopt laws and policies
which give the Treaty language the broadest possible interpretation
and provide leadership on the aspirational aspects of the text rather
than following the strict legal obligations of the Treaty. 57 Moreover,
Treaty ratification might be used as a reason to systematically
reevaluate Canadian oceans policy and restructure Canada's ap-
proach to the oceans which would have cost implications.158
A possible direct economic cost of ratifying the LOS Convention
arises from Article 82, which is a revenue sharing provision respect-
ing mineral resources developed on the legal continental shelf within
national jurisdiction but beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. This
revenue sharing provision was a compromise between the states who
argued that national jurisdiction over the continental shelf extended
over the entire shelf, and those states which wished to restrict coastal
state shelf jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Canada was one of the
original promoters of this compromise provision. 5 The revenue
sharing provision obliges coastal states, after a five year grace pe-
156. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 35-36.
157. Concerning the minimalist and maximalist approach to treaty implementa-
tion, see T. McDORMAN, THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND THE CARACAS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 89-90 (1981).
158. The assumption made in Johnston's study on the future of Canadian oceans
policy, D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, is that Canada will ratify the LOS Convention.
159. Hage, supra note 12, at 8-9 and McDorman, supra note 11, at 200-03.
riod, to contribute one percent of the annual volume or value of pro-
duction at a site beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit. The rate of con-
tribution would rise by one percent per year until the twelfth year,
after which the rate would remain at seven percent. Canada ex-
pressed reservations about this formula in 1980, claiming that "the
suggested rate could make it uneconomic for Canada to explore and
exploit its continental margin."' 60
The LOS Convention establishes several new institutions, all of
which are to be funded by parties to the Treaty. The most costly new
institution will be the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The
ISA is expected to become self-financing through revenue generated
by the exploitation of deep seabed minerals. Prior to self-sufficiency,
however, the ISA is to be funded by the parties to the Treaty based
upon the scale of assessment used for the regular United Nations
budget. 1' Since the industrialized states contribute the largest
amount of the United Nations budget, the non-participation of some
or all of them could increase the contribution required by those
states which do ratify the Treaty." 2 Arguably, should Canada ratify
the Treaty, Canada's contribution would be exceptionally large or, at
best, extremely variable. Moreover, it can also be argued that the
financing of another international bureaucracy is a waste of
resources.
163
160. Statement of the delegation of Canada dated April 2, 1980, UNCLOS III,
Vol. XIII, supra note 16, at 102. It is adjacent to Newfoundland that the revenue-shar-
ing provision may be applicable. As in other Federal states there had existed uncertainty
whether the central authority or the adjacent provincial government had legislative com-
petence regarding the continental shelf. On Canada's west coast the Supreme Court of
Canada in the B.C. Offshore Reference, [1967] S.C.R. 792 settled the issue in favor of
the central authority. The Supreme Court of Canada similarly decided the Hibernia Ref-
erence, [1984] S.C.R. 86 respecting the east coast. Following the 1984 decision, in Feb-
ruary 1985, Canada and Newfoundland signed an Accord on Joint Management of Off-
shore Oil and Gas Resources which effectively ensures that Newfoundland will be able to
manage, control and benefit from hydrocarbon resources developed on its adjacent shelf.
Although the Accord was strongly supported politically, it has been suggested that the
purpose of the joint Accord was "to attempt to deny a constitutional fact" and the Ac-
cord "may set a cloud of uncertainty above" a situation that had been calmed by the
Court decisions. Harrison, Jurisdiction Over Offshore Installations; Canada in OFF-
SHORE PETROLEUM INSTALLATIONS LAW AND FINANCING: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES at 68 (I. Gault ed. 1986).
In the Accord no reference was made to international revenue-sharing, Article 82 of
the LOS Convention. Newfoundland has not found favor with this provision. Currently
the major hydrocarbon activity off Newfoundland is within 200 nautical miles. This was
given as the reason for not including reference to Article 82. Yaffe, Obligations Unful-
filled, Ottawa told, Toronto Globe and Mail, May 30, 1985, at A8.
161. LOS Convention, supra note 2, Article 160(2)(c).
162. Uncertainties regarding the funding provisions are commented upon by W.
HAUSER, THE LEGAL REGIME FOR DEEP SEABED MINING UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION (trans. by F. Dielmann) 134-35 (1983). The United Kingdom has esti-
mated the costs regarding the international seabed regime, see statement of Malcolm
Rifkind, supra note 34, at 562.
163. One of the United States concerns with the establishment of the deep seabed
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This concern about the uncertain direct cost of a new bureaucracy
has forced a number of the middle-industrialized states to reevaluate
their policy of attempting to bring the LOS Convention into force
without the major contributors to the United Nations budget. In ad-
dition, it has forced the Preparatory Commission to consider ways to
build up the ISA bureaucracy slowly, based only upon need.'"
One of the aspects of the LOS Convention that the United States
found objectionable concerned technology transfer. It was the United
States' view that the LOS Convention provides for the mandatory
transfer to developing countries of sensitive or defense-related tech-
nology or technology giving United States' companies a competitive
edge.165 This mandatory transfer would discourage potential invest-
ment and have an economic cost to companies and states involved in
deep seabed mining. In interpreting the relevant technology transfer
provisions, the United States opted to take a "worse case" scena-
rio.'66 The better view is that there are no strict legal obligations for
mandatory transfer of technology. Rather, the provisions "establish
certain standards of conduct which to a certain extent reflect the
already existing practice."167 Canada has always viewed that the
transfer of technology provisions were "unthreatening" and would
not impose a significant economic cost. 68
A Canadian ratification and participation in deep seabed mining
as a pioneer state may also entail additional costs since part of the
September 5, 1986 Preparatory Commission Understanding is that
applicants will assist the ISA and the Enterprise in preparing a plan
of work and in exploration.'
Conclusion
The ultimate economic cost of implementing the diverse provisions
of the LOS Convention will have to await a detailed study. Simi-
larly, the costs of participation in the LOS Convention deep seabed
mining regime will have to await further study. Unlike numerous
mining regime has been that another international bureaucracy would be created which
would be inefficient and ineffective. See Malone, The United States and the Law of the
Sea After UNCLOS III, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 32 (1983).
164. Kimball, supra iote 23, at 380-81.
165. Malone, Sea Treaty, supra note 27, at 55.
166. Van Dyke & Teichman, supra note 29, at 538.
167. Boczek, Transfer of Technology and UNCLOS III Draft Convention in John-
ston & Letalik, supra note 11, at 510.
168. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 23.
169. Point 14 of the September 1986 Understanding, see supra note 59.
other countries with deep seabed capabilities, Canada has shown lit-
tle interest in the various United States-inspired regimes that might
supplant the LOS Convention regime. Therefore, it is unnecessary to
compare economic costs and benefits of mining outside the LOS
Convention regime, with the costs of mining under the LOS Conven-
tion regime since it appears that Canada's choices, at least for the
foreseeable future, are to mine within the LOS Convention regime or
not at all.
The restraint on jurisdictional expansion of the LOS Convention is
also important when considering ratification of the Treaty on the ba-
sis of economic policy. Any restraint placed on the possibility of
managing and developing the living resources and polymetallic sul-
fides beyond 200 nautical miles is detrimental to economic develop-
ment, and the LOS Convention might inhibit economic development
of those resources, although the international acceptance of the lim-
its contained in the Treaty, and not the Treaty itself, is the real
inhibition.
From an economic policy perspective, one would have to conclude
that ratification of the LOS Convention provides no obvious benefit.
The arguments against ratification would be the uncertainty regard-
ing the deep seabed regime, the economic costs that would arise
from ratification, and the possibility that the Treaty would deter fu-
ture economic development.
RATIFICATION AS A QUESTION OF FOREIGN POLICY
The decision on ratification of the LOS Convention has important
implications for general foreign policy. Canada must be concerned
with a possible United States' reaction to a decision to ratify the
Treaty. Moreover, the ratification decision must take into account
Canada's perceived role in the North-South Dialogue. Canada must
also consider the importance of ratification to the United Nations
system and the impact of ratification on Canada's traditional policy
of reliance upon multilateral processes and law, rather than reliance
on national power to accomplish its goals.
The United States
Political Concerns
The United States has been stridently opposed to the LOS Con-
vention, not only because of the detail of the deep seabed mining
provisions, but also because the Treaty is perceived as supporting
wealth redistribution at the international level and the goals of the
New International Economic Order. 170 All states must anticipate the
170. See Ratiner supra note 22 at 1006.
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United States' reaction when considering ratification. This is particu-
larly true of Canada, since the United States has many ways to
bring pressure to bear upon Canada. Direct pressure from the
United States not to become a party to the LOS Convention has
allegedly been exerted on some countries,"' although apparently not
Canada.
Canada and the United States were on opposite sides of many is-
sues at UNCLOS 111.172 On several occasions this spilled over into
incidents between the two states.173 Moreover, Canada and the
United States have been involved in a highly publicized ocean dis-
pute, the east coast maritime boundary court case,1 74 although this
dispute did not directly involve the LOS Convention. There have
been and continue to be countless ocean problems between the two
countries.1
75
While Canada has tried to assist in appeasing the United States'
dislike for the LOS Convention, Canadian representatives were ex-
tremely upset with the United States' decision to reject the LOS
Treaty, lodging an official protest in 1982 and voicing their distress
at the LOS Convention signing ceremony. 17  As one commentator
put it, the United States' action respecting the LOS Convention
"was a direct menace to Canada," since the Treaty was to be of
major benefit to Canada. 7 The United States has been less than
171. Hage, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; A Cana-
dian Retrospective, 40 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 1, 22 (1983).
172. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 73-74. Concerning Canada-United States law
of the sea issues up to the mid-1970s, see Hollick, United States and Canadian Policy
Processes in Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 518 (1975).
173. In 1979 nineteen United States vessels were arrested on Canada's west coast
while fishing for albacore tuna. The United States position was that tuna, as a highly
migratory specie, was not included with a coast state's 200 nautical mile jurisdiction over
fisheries. Canada took the opposite view. Fines were paid by the United States vessels
and the two states attempted to work out their differences over tuna with the result being
a 1981 bilateral treaty. Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privi-
leges, May 26, 1981, United States-Canada, U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 10057. See Rasmussen,
The Tuna War: Fishery Jurisdiction in International Law, U. ILL L. REV. 755, 764-65
(1981) and Wang, supra note 131, at 35-36. Regarding tuna and the LOS Convention,
see Harrison, supra note 36 at 351.
174. See Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. 295.
175. Solving these continuing ocean problems is discussed in D. JOHNSTON, supra
note 80, at 74-76.
176. See Statement of Canadian External Affairs Minister MacEachen at the
signing ceremony for the LOS Convention, supra note 17. Canadian newspapers reported
the Minister's speech with the following headlines: Hamovitch, Canada calls for Ameri-
can reversal at Law of the Sea, Halifax Mail-Star, Dec. 7, 1982, at 2, and Sign Sea
Pact, MacEachen Urges U.S., Toronto Globe and Mail, Dec. 7, 1982, at 17.
177. S. CLARKSON, CANADA AND THE REAGAN CHALLENGE 215-16 (1982), see
pleased with Canada's actions at UNCLOS III and regarding the
LOS Convention. In fact, Canada has been singled out for comment
by United States law of the sea officials. One United States repre-
sentative to UNCLOS III felt that much of the opposition to the
United States' position at the final stages of the conference "was
incited by Canada which sought to protect its own self-interest in
land-based mineral production." '178
The difficult issue for Canada is whether ratification of the LOS
Convention would unduly upset bilateral relations. Bilateral relations
between the two states are always sensitive and the Reagan Admin-
istration is particularly opposed to the LOS Convention. This may
lead Canada to realize that ratification could have a serious political
cost. However, America's southern neighbor, Mexico, did not feel
constrained by the United States." 9 On a more general level, Cana-
dian decisions to depart from United States foreign policy are not
easily made. As one commentator put it: "the prevailing view in the
[Canadian] bureaucracy [is] that making accommodations with
American positions is preferable to articulating strategies that give
priority to Canadian interests."180 Therefore, it could be argued that
the safest political and bureaucratic path would be to accede to the
United States' position.
The "Missing-American" Factor
Although Treaty ratifications have been slow in accumulating, it
can be safely predicted that the LOS Convention will come into
force in the early 1990s.1 81 The overwhelming number of signatories
to the Treaty and the support continually demonstrated for the
Treaty at the Preparatory Commission and in the General Assembly
leads to no other conclusion. The most recent General Assembly
Resolution on the LOS Convention of November 5, 1986, which
called upon states to adhere to the Treaty and not take actions to
defeat its object and purpose, received 145 positive votes. Only two
states voted against the resolution (the United States and Turkey)
generally id. at 204-05, 212-20.
178. Malone, Sea Treaty, supra note 27, at 54.
179. Mexico ratified the LOS Convention on March 18, 1983. Implementing legis-
lation was submitted to the Mexican Congress in early 1986. Federal Act Relating to the
Sea and the Presidential explanatory memorandum are reprinted in 7 LAw OF THE SEA
BULLETIN 46 (1986). See also Szekely, Implementing the New Law of the Sea: The
Mexican Experience in GLOBAL FISHERIES: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 1980s 51-72 (B.J.
Rothschild ed. 1983), and Cicin-Sain, Orbach, Sellers & Manzanilla, Conflictual Inter-
dependence: United States-Mexican Relations on Fishery Resources, 26 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 769 (1986).
180. S. CLARKSON, supra note 177, at 298.
181. Based on a survey by Australia the most likely date for the entry into force of
the LOS Treaty is in the early 1990s. Kimball, supra note 23, at 381.
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and five states abstained."8 2
It is, however, difficult to envision a scenario in which the United
States will accede to the LOS Convention. Even if an administration
less stridently opposed to the Treaty is elected, it is unlikely that the
United States would become a party.18 3 Throughout the UNCLOS
III negotiations, there was a refrain that the final product would
have to be acceptable to the United States Senate,""" since ulti-
mately the LOS Convention would have to be supported by two-
thirds of the Senate in order for the United States to ratify. This is
now unlikely to ever take place because of the complexity of the
Treaty, the numerous issues it covers, the special interest groups that
find particular aspects objectionable, and most importantly, the po-
litical history of the Treaty since it was rejected by a popular con-
servative President.
How important should this "missing-American" factor be in Ca-
nadian calculations respecting the LOS Convention? It could be
boldly asserted that without the active support of the United States
no major international regime can be successful. This argument is
made more compelling if other major western states join the United
States in rejecting the Treaty. In such a situation, it can be argued
that the International Seabed Authority, the other provisions of the
Treaty, and many of the rules and standards established by the
Treaty would become mere "paper tigers."
However, even as a "paper tiger," the LOS Convention is likely to
command significant world support. Morever, the existence of the
International Seabed Authority and the continual threat to challenge
the legality of deep seabed activities taking place outside the LOS
Convention regime 8 5 will make both private investors and state en-
182. Council on Ocean Law, Oceans Pol'y News I (Dec. 1986).
183. It has been predicted that a future administration will have no choice but to
reverse the current United States position on the LOS Convention. Ratiner, supra note
22, at 1021.
184. See, e.g., Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 373, 390-91 (1978), where the author warns that a comprehensive law of the
sea treaty providing for internationalization of the deep seabed would be unratifiable by
the Senate. In a statement made by President Reagan prior to the last negotiating ses-
sion at UNCLOS III he also warned about the necessity of ensuring the Treaty be ac-
ceptable to the Senate. Statement of President Reagan of January 29, 1982, reprinted in
M. Nordquist & C. Park, supra note 24, at 554-55.
185. The legality of seabed mining activity taken outside the LOS Convention
could be directly challenged by any state although the challenge is more likely to come
by a request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. See Moss,
Insuring Unilaterally Licensed Deep Seabed Mining Operations Against Adverse Rul-
ings by the International Court of Justice: An Assessment of the Risk, 14 OCEAN DEv.
terprises unwilling to invest in independent deep seabed mining ven-
tures. s18  Thus, concerns over independent deep seabed mining, are
unlikely to provide reasons for avoiding the LOS Convention regime.
This possibility is reinforced by the poor prognosis for the mineral
resources market for the foreseeable future and the fact that the
Preparatory Commission is working to make the international re-
gime economically attractive. The final blow to United States isola-
tion would be the ratification of the Treaty by a major mining state
such as Japan or France. Such ratification is a strong possibility,
187
and would indicate that the international regime is sufficiently at-
tractive and secure for participating miners.
Given that Canada has only a minimal interest in deep seabed
mining, and that United States non-participation may not signifi-
cantly affect the international regime, the "missing-American" fac-
tor should not be a major independent consideration in Canada's de-
cision whether or not to ratify the LOS Convention.
The North-South Dialogue
While it is questionable how much economic benefit the least de-
veloped countries will derive from the new ocean regime, and in par-
ticular, from deep ocean mining, 88 there is little doubt that the
& INT'L. L.J. 161, 163-75 (1984). The arguments that might be presented are briefly
outlined by D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 AmI. J. OF
INT'L L. 281-85 (1983) and see generally Shingleton, UNCLOS III and the Struggle for
Law: The Elusive Customary Law of Seabed Mining, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L. L.J. 33-
63 (1983); Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage of Man-
kind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 521 (1983); and Van
Dyke & Yuen, supra note 7; L. Sohn, Special Problems Concerning Potential Deep Sea-
bed Mining Litigations in UNITED STATES LAW OF THE SEA POLICY: OPTIONS FOR THE
FuTURE 195-209 (1985).
186. Larson, supra note 25, at 291. Larson comments that it is unlikely that pri-
vate companies will undertake deep seabed mining activities outside the LOS Convention
regime because of the potential legal challenge. He further comments that "[i]t is also
doubtful if such a mining operation would have a sufficiently clear legal title to a mine
site to borrow the necessary capital for research, development and operations, unless they
received a state subsidy." Id. This view was put more forcefully by Ratiner, Recipro-
cating State Arrangements: A Transition or an Alternative? in A. KOERS & B. OXMAN,
supra note 53, at 195-203. There are also serious concerns whether the LOS Convention
provides adequate protection for investors interests. See Johnson, Clark & Otto, supra
note 123, at 209.
187. In reference to Japan, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
188. Borgese, The Law of the Sea: Its Potential for Generating International Rev-
enue, 4 OCEAN Y.B. 15, 15-27 (1983). Borgese suggests that what is really necessary is
an ocean development tax on all ocean resource harvesting. A concise statement of the
proposed ocean development tax is presented in E. BORGESE, supra note 7, at 63-66 in
which she notes that in 1971 when the proposal was first made, Canada expressed sup-
port for a "voluntary international development tax." In 1978 Nepal suggested the estab-
lishment of a Common Heritage Fund which ultimately was not actively pursued at UN-
CLOS III. Boczek indicates that the Nepal proposal, "which would have made real
progress in applying the NIEO principle in the law of the sea," came too late in the
proceedings to be useful and also ran up against "inconsistent and hypocritical" attitudes
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Group of 77 sees the LOS Convention as being of considerable sym-
bolic importance in the continuing North-South Dialogue. The
Chairman of the Group of 77 at UNCLOS III, Ambassador Arias
Schreiber from Peru, stated: "The structure we have all built to-
gether is the most advanced expression of international law for de-
velopment and a cornerstone of the task of establishing the new in-
ternational economic order."189
Canada was generally supportive of the aims of the Group of 77 at
UNCLOS 111,190 and has perceived the Treaty to be an important
part of improving North-South relations.191 On a number of issues at
UNCLOS III, Canada sided with the Group of 77 in order to fur-
ther Canada's own interests. Developing countries have not been shy
in pointing this out and in indicating that Canada was obviously one
of the winners at UNCLOS III. A failure of Canada to ratify the
Treaty could lead to a cooling of relations with numerous developing
countries and might seriously undermine Canada's credibility in
North-South discussions. 92
Multilateralism
Canada achieved much at UNCLOS III but there was a cost.
Canada's traditional image as a helpful conciliator was only infre-
quently apparent, being replaced by an image "of an acquisitive,
enormously capable, somewhat immodest, frequently aggressive,
coastal state."' 93 As a middle-power, dependent in foreign policy is-
sues on its image of fairness and balance, Canada's decision regard-
from many developing states. Boczek, supra note 30, at 18. For a more positive view of
deep seabed mining and developing countries See D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED
MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1976). There is little debate that the LOS Convention will directly do much to narrow
the gap between have and have-not states. However, in a poignantly optimistic manner
Borgese indicates that the LOS Convention is a legitimate commencement to a process
for ocean resource development that would undoubtedly benefit have-not states, see E.
BORGESE, supra note 7.
189. UNCLOS III, supra note 16, at 21.
190. See Hage, supra note 12, at 3 and D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 17 regard-
ing the seabed mining regime and the Common Heritage of Mankind. See also, Buzan,
supra note 1, at 163-64.
191. See address of Mark MacGuigan, Canadian External Affairs Minister to the
U.N. General Assembly on September 21, 1981 as cited by Beesley, The Negotiating
Strategy of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Partners - A Pattern
for Future Multilateral International Conferences?, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183,
184 (1983).
192. Regarding Canada and the North-South Dialogue, see D. DEWITT AND J.
KIRTON, CANADA AS A PRINCIPAL POWER, 81-82 (1983).
193. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 80, at 65.
ing the LOS Convention must take into account diplomatic credibil-
ity and a cynicism that would arise from non-ratification of a Treaty
that gives so much to Canada. A negative decision on Treaty ratifi-
cation could undermine Canadian initiatives and credibility on other
issues in similar fora.
Traditional Canadian policy has been to support the role and im-
portance of the United Nations. This policy was reasserted in the
1985 External Affairs policy reappraisal."" The LOS Convention is
a product of the United Nations system and stands as one of its
major accomplishments. The decision on ratification may speak
volumes about Canada's view of the United Nations. Moreover, the
UNCLOS III process was a non-traditional approach to dealing with
multilateral problems.195 The process was largely successful in bal-
ancing competing states' interests and in achieving general agree-
ment on almost all issues. Ratification can be viewed as the ultimate
sign of approval for this non-traditional process which attempted to
accommodate the interests of all states rather than the traditional,
confrontational approach to treaty-making.
Most importantly, as a middle-power, Canada has long acknowl-
edged the necessity of international law and international process to
its well-being. As the 1985 External Affairs policy review states:
Membership in such organizations (NATO, the United Nations, the Com-
monwealth and la Francophonie) allows us to influence the policies of larger
countries through developing positions which carry the support of all mem-
bers. As well, our standing with smaller countries rises as we assist them to
have their voices heard collectively and, thereby, to carry more weight. 19
Canada does not have the power to force its views on other states,
thus Canada has to proceed multilaterally to achieve its goals. More-
over, Canada has not had significant success in undertaking unilat-
eral action. 197 In relations with the United States, for example, Can-
ada has frequently sought to gather international support for its
position so as to be better able to withstand United States' pressure.
Canada approached UNCLOS III with this in mind. As one com-
mentator has stated: "In sharp contrast to the Reagan Administra-
194. CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, COMPETITIVENESS AND SE-
CURITY: DIRECTIONS FOR CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41 (1985).
195. The most comprehensive work on the UNCLOS III negotiating process is
Koh & Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A
COMMENTARY 29 (M. Nordquist ed. 1985). On the consensus approach used at UN-
CLOS III, see Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 75 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 324
(1981). More generally, see Zemanek, Majority Rule and Consensus Technique in Law-
Making Diplomacy in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 857 (R. Macdonald & D. Johnston eds.
1983).
196. CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 194, at 25.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 66-73.
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tion's attempt to achieve security from international regulation, Can-
ada's large stake in the Law of the Sea lay precisely in achieving
security via the reinforcement of international authority - first over
mineral markets and second in international law."' 98 The LOS Con-
vention is a major accomplishment of a multilateral negotiation and
a Canadian ratification decision must consider whether, as a policy,
Canada should continue to support multilateralism rather than
unilateralism.
Conclusion
From a foreign policy perspective there is much to be gained from
ratification of the LOS Convention in terms of relationships with de-
veloping countries and the North-South Dialogue. However, the
most important gains will be made from support for the multilateral
treaty-making process, the United Nations, and multilateral ap-
proaches to difficult issues. Non-ratification will not necessarily dis-
rupt Canadian foreign policy or betray its commitment to multilater-
alism, the North-South Dialogue or the United Nations, but non-
ratification is of no assistance in these matters. Canada was a leader
at UNCLOS III and intensely pursued its self-interest. For Canada,
to have worked so hard and benefited so much, to decide not to rat-
ify would be inconsistent with a credible and stable foreign policy.
As a matter of bilateral relations with the United States, non-rati-
fication is the safest policy. On balance, however, it would seem,
from a foreign policy perspective, that Canada should ratify the
LOS Convention.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the earlier desires of states such as Canada to hurry the
entry into force of the LOS Convention, 99 Canada did not ratify.
With urgency of ratification no longer perceived, it can be expected
that Canada will continue to weigh its options before making a deci-
sion. The progress of the Preparatory Commission in devising a deep
seabed mining regime acceptable to the mining states will be impor-
tant in the timing of a Canadian decision. The September 5, 1986
Understanding sets the coming into force of the Treaty as the final
limit on applicants for pioneer investor status. Timing may also be
198. S. CLARKSON, supra note 177, at 215-16 (emphasis in original).
199. This was the strategy adopted by the middle-industrialized states immediately
following the completion of the LOS Convention, Kimball, supra note 23, at 376.
affected by policies undertaken by other Western, industrialized
states. Already Iceland has ratified, others like France and Japan
could follow and the Federal Republic of Germany and United
Kingdom may yet accede.
Given Canada's current "wait and see" policy, should the LOS
Convention not receive the necessary sixty ratifications to bring it
into force, Canada will likely never ratify the Treaty. The most rea-
sonable prediction, however, is that the Treaty will come into force
in the early 1990s. Therefore, at some point Canada will have to
decide whether to ratify the LOS Convention. When the time comes
to decide on ratification, a balancing of the important issues outlined
above will be necessary. The major arguments against ratification
are:
* there are no further benefits to be gained from the Treaty and much of
the Treaty has or may emerge as customary international law;
" there is an unknown economic cost;
" there may be a significant political cost;
* ratification may unduly restrict future Canadian ocean policy; and
* the deep seabed regime may be unworkable.
The major arguments for ratification are:
" the Treaty provides an acceptable balance between Canada's maritime
and coastal state interests;
" there is a need for stable ocean law;
" there is a need to promote respect for international law and multilateral-
ism rather than unilateralism;
" there is a need to consolidate the international legal position of Canada's
ocean laws and policy, particularly respecting the Arctic; and
" the Treaty is important to Canada's diplomatic credibility and the North-
South Dialogue.
How the balance is ultimately reached will depend on whether rat-
ification of the LOS Convention is seen primarily as:
• a foreign policy issue;
" an oceans policy issue; or
* an economic policy issue.
If the ratification of the Treaty is seen as a foreign policy issue, it
is predictable that Canada will ratify since the long-term interests of
diplomatic credibility, supporting multilateralism over unilateralism,
and advancing the North-South Dialogue should outweigh the con-
cern over a negative reaction by the United States to a Canadian
ratification.
As an oceans policy issue, again Canada would likely ratify since
the need to consolidate Canada's previous ocean policy, the stability
and general acceptability of the Treaty regime, and the ability to use
the LOS Convention as a platform for an integrated national ocean
policy, should outweigh any possible restrictions on future Canadian
ocean policy found in the Treaty and the few provisions that are
unfavorable to Canadian interests.
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As an economic policy issue, it is less likely that Canada will favor
ratification because the restraining aspects of the Treaty (which may
curtail future resource exploitation and management of accessible
oceans resources) the uncertainty regarding the deep seabed mining
regime, and the economic costs of ratification should outweigh any
economic benefits of ratification that have not already been realized.
Therefore, for Canada, the answer to the question - Will Canada
Ratify the LOS Convention? - will be answered by the policy per-
spective that is predominant when the question needs to be
answered.

